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INTRODUCTION: NOW AND AGAIN
In 2017, more than 6.5% of America’s civilian workforce
identified as disabled.1 With disability commonplace across our
* Ryan H. Nelson is a Research Associate at the Harvard Law School Project on
Disability and a member of the adjunct faculty at Boston University School of Law and New
England Law | Boston. He previously served as in-house employment law counsel where
he advised human resources and leave administration professionals, as well as management,
on leave as an accommodation and handled all phases of accommodation- and leave-related
dispute resolution, up to and including litigation. He received his LL.M. from Harvard Law
School; his J.D., cum laude, from the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University;
and his B.S.B.A. with a major in economics from the University of Florida. He would like to
thank Jane Bestor, Jarod S. Gonzalez, Michael Z. Green, Jasmine E. Harris, Marcy Karin,
Arthur S. Leonard, Nicole Buonocore Porter, Hina Shah, Jennifer B. Shinall, Sabine Juliette
Tsuruda, Deborah Widiss, and all of the participants at the 2019 Colloquium for Scholarship
on Employment and Labor Law for their insightful comments.
1. As of 2017, 12.8% of American civilians were disabled, 51.0% of whom were
“people in the working ages of 18–64,” and 51.0% of 12.8% is 6.528%. LEWIS KRAUS,
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workplaces, it is no surprise that employees with a disability often
need leave from work “to attend medical appointments related to
an episodic or chronic medical impairment,” “obtain medical
treatment,” or “recuperate from an illness or surgery, or [the]
exacerbation of symptoms associated with a[] . . . medical
impairment,”2 after which they generally return to work. When
employers fail to provide employees with sufficient disability leave
or threaten to discipline or terminate employees who would take
such leave, employees often turn to the law for recourse.
Yet, federal law is lacking in robust workplace leave
entitlements, including vis-à-vis disability leave. In fact, the only
federal law to provide leave explicitly to employees on account of
their own health condition remains the Family and Medical Leave
Act of 1993 (FMLA),3 which provides certain employees with up to
twelve workweeks of unpaid leave in any rolling twelve-month
period “[b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the
employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such
employee.”4 Employees excluded from the FMLA’s coverage
and/or employees who require more than the FMLA’s rather
limited twelve-week leave entitlement often turn to the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),5 arguing that employers must
provide leave as an accommodation under Title I of the ADA’s
requirement to offer “reasonable accommodations” to employees
with a disability so long as doing so would not impose an undue
hardship on business operations.6
Although Congress declined to mention leave explicitly in Title
I of the ADA, it directed the agency with oversight over that title,

ERIC LAUER, RACHEL COLEMAN & ANDREW HOUTENVILLE, REHAB. RSCH. & TRAINING CTR. ON
DISABILITY STAT. & DEMOGRAPHICS, UNIV. OF N.H., 2017 DISABILITY STATISTICS ANNUAL
REPORT
2
(2018),
https://disabilitycompendium.org/sites/default/files/useruploads/2017_AnnualReport_2017_FINAL.pdf.
2. Leave, JOB ACCOMMODATION NETWORK, https://askjan.org/topics/leave.cfm (last
visited Feb. 17, 2021).
3. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D).
5. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see also John F. Wymer & Bryan A. Stillwagon, How
Much Leave Is Enough? Reasonable Accommodation, Undue Hardship, and the Intersection of the
FMLA and the ADA, 40 EMP. REL. L.J. 22, 22–30 (2014); Jessica B. Summers, The Shifting Law
Surrounding Leave as a Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA, 65 FED. LAW. 13, 13–14 (2018).
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the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),7 to
“issue regulations . . . to carry out [Title I] . . . .”8 Following that
directive, on February 28, 1991, the EEOC published a notice of
proposed rulemaking construing the sorts of accommodations that
may be required by Title I as including “providing additional
unpaid leave [beyond accrued paid leave] for necessary treatment,”
citing congressional reports that ostensibly supported its
conclusion.9 A few months later, on July 26, 1991, the agency
promulgated its final rule, once again listing “unpaid leave” as an
example of an accommodation that may be required by the
statute.10 From that moment on, employees with a disability
began requesting, and their employers began granting, leaves as an
accommodation bounded only by the requirements that such
leaves be reasonable and impose no undue hardship. Indeed,
leave has been described as “the most common reasonable
accommodation” under Title I of the ADA11 with stakeholders
ranging from the EEOC, the plaintiffs’ bar, and disability-rights
advocates to employer-industry groups, the management bar, and
the judiciary nearly ubiquitously endorsing leave as an

7. Laws Enforced by the EEOC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 17, 2021) [hereinafter
Laws Enforced by the EEOC].
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12116.
9. Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg.
8578, 8595 (Feb. 28, 1991) (citing S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 31 (1989); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt.
2, at 62 (1990); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 39 (1990)). The first and third of these reports
do not support the proffered proposition. Senate Report 116 addresses, inter alia, part-time
and modified work schedules and states that the law “does not entitle the individual with a
disability to more paid leave time than non-disabled employees,” but it does not
affirmatively address leave as an accommodation. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 31. In the same vein,
House Report 485(III) (the House Judiciary Report) addresses, inter alia, part-time and
modified work schedules, but says nothing of leave as an accommodation. H.R. REP. NO.
101-485, pt. 3, at 39. Only House Report 485(II) (the House Labor Report) actually supports
what the EEOC says it supports. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 62. See infra section I.B for a
discussion of the legislative history of leave as an accommodation.
10. Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg.
35,726, 35,744 (July 26, 1991) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. (2021)). See the explanation
of 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) for this discussion.
11. Leave of Absence Is Not Accommodation of First Resort, LEAVE & DISABILITY
COORDINATION HANDBOOK NEWSL., March 2001 (summarizing statement of David Fram at
the National Employment Law Institute’s Employment Law Conference 2000); accord Desda
Moss, How and Why You Can Create Reasonable Accommodations, HRNEWS (Jun. 20, 2017)
(stating that the “most common types” of accommodations include “allowing leave time”).
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accommodation subject only to the reasonableness and undue
hardship guardrails.12
In this Article, I challenge that conventional proposition. More
specifically, I argue that disability leave—even when it is
reasonable and imposes no undue hardship on the employer—is
not always required under Title I of the ADA and similar statutes.
Viz., I contend that employers never need to provide
accommodations to employees who presently cannot work13 on
account of their disability or for any other reason, including when
such employees need leave as an accommodation. In contrast,
subject to the reasonableness and undue hardship inquiries, I argue
that employers must accommodate only those employees who
presently can work, but who choose to take disability leave instead
of working. In other words, as with all accommodations, leave
requests should not only be vetted to confirm: (1) their general
reasonableness, and (2) that this specific leave will not impose an
undue hardship on this employer, but also to confirm that (3) at the
time of the leave’s inception, the employee can perform the
essential functions of the job but takes disability leave in lieu of
work, and (4) there exists a reasonable possibility of the employee
returning to work. In other words, employees must be able to work
now and again. By interposing these elements into the disability
accommodation framework, I posit that some reasonable leaves
imposing no undue hardship are legally required, whereas others
are not.
To begin defending this provocative thesis, Part I presents a
holistic, descriptive analysis of federal disability accommodation
law, delving into statutory and regulatory texts, as well as their
announced and implied purposes; legislative histories; and
administrative agency, judicial, scholarly, and practitioner
interpretations thereof. This Part proceeds to conduct a linguistic
examination of the relevant statutory and regulatory texts which
12. See generally infra section I.C to see the widespread support for this conventional
belief. For further information concerning the reasonableness and undue hardship inquiries,
see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401–02 (2002).
13. Throughout this Article, I routinely use the word “work” for easy reading instead
of tracking the cumbersome statutory language each and every time (i.e., “perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds”). See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(8). This substitution is intended for brevity’s sake only and is not meant to have
import. Quite obviously, an inability to work is not the same thing as an inability to perform
the essential functions of the position as the latter could still imply an ability to work in
another position.
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has never been undertaken, a paramount element in the analyses of
a growing-textualist judiciary. It also provides a unique exploration
of the level of deference that courts must afford agency
interpretations endorsing disability leave as an accommodation.
This Part also digs deeper into the legislative history of the federal
disability accommodation statutes than previous scholarship,
citing and analyzing sources never before discussed in employment
law scholarship for the proposition that leave may be required as
an accommodation, at least some of the time. Finally, Part I clarifies
the lower courts’ burgeoning and confused debates over disability
leave as an accommodation and situates this Article’s thesis within
the debate over indefinite leave and long-term disability leave as
accommodations, the last of which was recently considered by the
Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari that was ultimately
denied, hopefully allowing the lower courts sufficient time to
pursue clarity.
Part II takes the conclusion of Part I to be true. That is, assuming
arguendo that Title I of the ADA and the other federal disability
accommodation statutes do not require employers to provide leave
as an accommodation when, at the start of the leave, the employee
cannot perform the essential functions of the job, how can we
harmonize such a construction with the remainder of federal law?
To that end, this Part contextualizes leave as an accommodation for
employees with a disability by comparing it with leave as an
accommodation for employees’ religious practices and beliefs
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)14 and
part-time and modified work schedules as accommodations for
employees with a disability under the ADA. In sum, Part II resolves
that this Article’s thesis works within the larger structure of
federal law.
Finally, Part III concludes with a call to action. A broad
entitlement to disability leaves as accommodations carries great
normative appeal. Indeed, all employers (not just those covered by
the ADA and similar statutes) should provide all of their workers
(including their independent contractors and not just their
employees) with disability leave whenever possible to ensure their
workers’ ability to maintain gainful work once the need for leave
abates without the imposition of unnecessary costs on all parties
14. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255 (1964) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17).
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(e.g., job search costs for the worker, costs of recruiting for and
backfilling the position for the employer, costs to the family related
to the unemployment of a family member). Moreover, it benefits
society as a whole to both encourage prompt and proper medical
treatment of disabilities and to optimize workplace utility by
ensuring that adept workers perform their jobs. In short—disability
leave, as an accommodation, is good.
And, yet, we live in an era where fidelity to statutory text is
respected out of convenience and not out of principle.15 We should
abide by the text of all our laws, even those with which we disagree.
I chose to write this Article not only to call attention to the rampant
misinterpretation of federal law which, in and of itself, would
be worthy of scrutiny, but specifically because my normative
views oppose what I contend to be an accurate interpretation of the
law. Disability leave should be accommodated even when an
employee presently cannot work, but I argue that federal law does
not yet entitle employees to such an accommodation, even when it
would be reasonable and impose no undue hardship. Put another
way, commitment to the text of the ADA should outweigh the
normative appeal of a flawed interpretation of the ADA. It is my
hope that those who read this Article will not only be convinced by
my substantive argument addressing disability leaves as
accommodations, but also will take with them my conviction that
fidelity to the statutory text compels us to reach this Article’s
conclusion on one hand while reaching for a phone to urge
Congress to amend that statute with the other. Title I of the ADA
must be amended to explicitly provide accommodations to anyone
who “can or may be able to perform” the essential functions of the
position, thus permitting leave as an accommodation for
employees with a disability even if those employees cannot, at
present, do the job.
Prompt legislative action is necessary to codify a broad right of
workers with a disability to take leave as an accommodation before
the courts inflict a damaging and destabilizing, albeit accurate,
15. See generally Jason Scott Smith, How Kellyanne Conway’s Rules Violations Threaten
Democracy, WASH. POST (July 2, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/
2019/07/02/how-kellyanne-conways-rules-violations-threaten-democracy/; Garrett Epps,
What Pleases Trump Has the Force of Law, ATLANTIC (May 19, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/05/trump-doesnt-care-about-constitution/
589654/; Steve Denning, How Trump’s Cabinet Now Undermines the Rule of Law, FORBES (May
19, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2019/05/19/how-trumps-cabinetnow-undermines-the-rule-of-law/.
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blow to Title I of the ADA and similar laws by concluding that they
do not require such leave when employees presently cannot work.
In sum, I intend this Article to serve as a blinking warning light,
hopefully exposing a dangerous eventuality for American
employees that should be rectified promptly by Congress and the
President before the Supreme Court eliminates a right that most
observers assume the law already guarantees, leaving behind
countless employees with a disability who rely on leaves of absence
to remain valuable components of our workforce.
I. DISABILITY LEAVE AS AN ACCOMMODATION
Analyzing whether and when federal law requires employers
to provide employees with unpaid leave16 as an accommodation
requires untangling an intricate, often overlapping web of statutes,
rules and regulations that purport to implement those statutes,
subregulatory guidance from the agencies that administer those
statutes, and judicial decisions interpreting the foregoing morass.
This Part explains why textual fidelity to the disability
accommodation statutes in the workplace—more specifically, Title
I of the ADA; sections 501 and 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(the Rehab Act);17 and the Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment
Assistance Act of 1974 (VEVRAA)18—demands the conclusion that
they do not obligate employers to provide disability leave as an
accommodation to employees who cannot work at the time the
leave would begin. Of vital import to that conclusion are the
statutory and regulatory definitions of the term “qualified,” which
use the present-tense verbs “can” or “has” or the gerund noun
“having,” each instance of which is italicized in section I.A.1.
for easy reference before they are analyzed in greater detail in
section I.A.2–3.
A. Statutory and Regulatory Text
This section proceeds first with a cataloging of statutory and
regulatory support for the proposition that leave may be required
16. No federal laws mandate paid leave to all, or even most, American workers. Thus,
all leave referenced in this Article is unpaid leave.
17. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title V, §§ 501, 503, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355
(1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793).
18. Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, Title IV, § 402, Pub.
L. No. 93-508, 88 Stat. 1593 (1974) (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4212).
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as an accommodation in certain circumstances; I present those
sources objectively and without analysis at first. Subsequently, I
analyze these sources to explain why certain leaves are not required
accommodations. Finally, I consider what deference may be owed
to agency interpretations that support, conflict with, or clarify
statutory text.
1. Cataloging the law
To begin, Title I of the ADA prohibits any “covered entity,”
which is defined as public or private employers with fifteen or
more employees (excluding the United States and a few other
entities that are immaterial to this analysis), employment agencies,
labor organizations, and joint labor-management committees from
discriminating against a “qualified individual” on the basis of
disability.19 That prohibition includes “not making reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is
an . . . employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that
the accommodation would impose an undue hardship.”20 Title I
defines “qualified individual” as “an individual who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds.”21
The EEOC has promulgated two regulations implementing Title I
of the ADA stating that leaves of absence, under certain
circumstances not delineated by the regulations, may be required
accommodations for qualified individuals: (1) ”an employee with
an impairment that previously limited, but no longer substantially
limits, a major life activity may need leave . . . to permit him or her
to attend follow-up or ‘monitoring’ appointments with a health
care provider”22; and (2) ”an employer, in spite of its ‘no-leave’
policy, may, in appropriate circumstances, have to consider the
provision of leave to an employee with a disability as a reasonable
accommodation, unless the provision of leave would impose an
undue hardship.”23 The EEOC’s voluminous subregulatory
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (emphasis added); see also id. § 12111(2) (defining “covered
entity”), (5)(A) (defining “employer”), (5)(B) (excluding the United States and other entities
from the definition of “employer”).
20. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added).
21. Id. § 12111(8) (emphases added).
22. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(3) (2021).
23. Id. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.15(b)–(c) (“Disparate Impact Defenses”).
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guidance confirms the agency’s conviction that Title I of the ADA,
as well as its implementing regulations, require leave as an
accommodation at least some of the time.24
Similarly, section 501 of the Rehab Act prohibits disability
discrimination by the federal government,25 and section 504
clarifies that no “otherwise qualified individual with a disability”
shall, solely by reason of disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under, any federal program or activity or any
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.26 The
Rehab Act defines “individual with a disability” by incorporating
the definition from the ADA,27 but unlike Title I of the ADA, the
Rehab Act does not define the term “qualified.” Like Title I of the
ADA, the EEOC administers section 501 of the Rehab Act,28 and
although the EEOC has not promulgated any regulations explicitly
stating that leave may be an accommodation under section 501,29
the EEOC’s subregulatory guidance confirms that the agency views
sections 501, 503 (discussed below), and 504 of the Rehab Act as

24. Employer-Provided Leave and the Americans with Disabilities Act, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/ada-leave.cfm (last
visited Feb. 20, 2021) (“An employer must consider providing unpaid leave to an employee
with a disability as a reasonable accommodation if the employee requires it, and so long as
it does not create an undue hardship for the employer . . . .”) [hereinafter EEOC’s ADA Leave
Website]; U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-CVG-2003-1, ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT ¶¶ 17–20 (2002) [hereinafter EEOC Accommodation Enforcement
Guidance],
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/enforcement-guidance-reasonableaccommodation-and-undue-hardship-under-ada; U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
EEOC-NVTA-2008-3, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: APPLYING PERFORMANCE AND
CONDUCT STANDARDS TO EMPLOYEES WITH DISABILITIES (2008), https://www.eeoc.gov/
facts/performance-conduct.html [hereinafter EEOC Performance and Conduct Standards];
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-M-1A, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL
ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
§ 3.10(4), at 63–64 (1992), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED352763.pdf.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 791 (preempted with respect to airport security screeners as stated in
Joren v. Napolitano, 633 F.3d 1144, 1146 (7th Cir. 2011)); see also Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187,
193 (1996) (“[Section] 501 of the Rehab Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791, . . . prohibits discrimination on
the basis of disability in employment decisions by the Federal Government.”).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (emphasis added).
27. Id. § 705(20)(B) (“The term ‘individual with a disability’ means, for purposes of . . .
subchapter[] . . . IV . . . of this chapter [which includes Sections 501, 503, and 504 of the Rehab
Act], . . . any person who has a disability as defined [in the ADA].”).
28. Laws Enforced by the EEOC, supra note 7.
29. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203 (2021) (Rehab Act regulations).
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requiring leave as an accommodation, at least in some cases,30 even
though the EEOC does not administer the provisions of section 503
or the provisions of section 504 unrelated to employment
discrimination.31 Similarly, the U.S. Office of Personnel
Management’s Federal Personnel Manual states that, before a
federal agency fires an employee with a disability who “no longer
can perform the duties of his or her position efficiently and safely,”
it should consider granting to that employee “a liberal grant of
leave without pay when paid leave is exhausted.”32
In a similar vein to section 501 of the Rehab Act, Presidents
Clinton and Obama signed executive orders regarding
accommodations for federal employees, although none of the
orders mention leave.33 However, the EEOC published two
subregulatory guidance documents for one of those orders—
Executive Order 13,164.34 In one of those guidance documents, the
EEOC asks, “Are there steps an agency can take prior to receiving
a request for reasonable accommodation that will avoid
unnecessary delays in responding if a request is made?”, to which
it replies:

30. EEOC’s ADA Leave Website, supra note 24 (“This document also applies to Federal
employees protected under section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act, which has the same nondiscrimination requirements as the ADA.”); EEOC Accommodation Enforcement Guidance,
supra note 24, at 2 n.1 (“The analysis in this guidance applies to federal sector complaints of
non-affirmative action employment discrimination arising under section 501 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 29 U.S.C. § 791(g) (1994). It also applies to complaints of nonaffirmative action employment discrimination arising under section 503 and employment
discrimination under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 793(d), 794(d)
(1994).”).
31. Laws Enforced by the EEOC, supra note 7.
32. Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253, 258 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing U.S. OFF. OF PERS.
MGMT., FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL § 339-1-3(b) (1979)). Note that this provision contains
a recommendation (i.e., “should”), not a mandate. Id.
33. See Exec. Order No. 13,548, 75 Fed. Reg. 45,039 (July 26, 2010), reprinted in 29 U.S.C.
§ 791; Exec. Order No. 13,163, 65 Fed. Reg. 46,563 (July 26, 2000), reprinted in 29 U.S.C. § 791;
Exec. Order No. 13,164, 65 Fed. Reg. 46,565 (July 26, 2000), reprinted in 29 U.S.C. § 791.
34. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-CVG-2001-2, POLICY GUIDANCE
ON EXECUTIVE ORDER 13164: ESTABLISHING PROCEDURES TO FACILITATE THE PROVISION OF
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION (2000) [hereinafter EO 13164 Policy Guidance],
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/policy-guidance-executive-order-13164establishing-procedures-facilitate-provision; U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: POLICY GUIDANCE ON EXECUTIVE ORDER 13164: ESTABLISHING
PROCEDURES TO FACILITATE THE PROVISION OF REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION (2000),
https://www.eeoc.gov/federal-sector/questions-and-answers-policy-guidance-executiveorder-13164-establishing-procedures.
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Yes. To anticipate and limit impediments that may cause
unnecessary delay in providing reasonable accommodation,
agencies should review and modify, in advance of a specific
request, policies that might affect the agency’s ability to respond
promptly to requests for reasonable accommodation. Among the
policies that agencies should review are those that affect . . . the
flexibility to approve leave . . . .35

Based on this document and the EEOC’s other subregulatory
guidance on section 501 of the Rehab Act,36 it is clear that the agency
views section 501 and/or its regulations as imposing on federal
agencies the obligation to provide leave as an accommodation at
least under certain circumstances.
Section 503 of the Rehab Act does not, itself, prohibit
discrimination based on disability status, but rather it requires
federal contracts and subcontracts for the procurement of personal
property and nonpersonal services in excess of $10,000 to contain a
provision “requiring that the party contracting with the United
States shall take affirmative action to employ and advance in
employment qualified individuals with disabilities.”37 Hence, it is
by operation of contract that such federal contractors and
subcontractors are prohibited from engaging in discrimination
based on disability status, although many firms big enough to
secure a contract or subcontract with the federal government likely
are already barred from engaging in such discrimination by Title I
of the ADA.38 The agency that administers section 503, the U.S.
Department of Labor’s (DOL) Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs (OFCCP),39 has promulgated regulations
implementing section 503 confirming that
[i]t is unlawful for the contractor to fail to make reasonable
accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations
of an otherwise qualified applicant or employee with a
disability . . . unless such contractor can demonstrate that the

35. EO 13164 Policy Guidance, supra note 34, ¶ 15.
36. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title V, § 501, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 791).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (emphasis added).
38. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12111(2).
39. Jurisdiction Thresholds and Inflationary Adjustments, U.S. OFF. OF FED. CONT.
COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, https://www.dol.gov/ofccp/taguides/jurisdiction.htm (last visited
Feb. 22, 2021) [hereinafter OFCCP, Jurisdiction Thresholds].
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accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of its business.40

Those regulations define “qualified individual” as one “who satisfies
the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related
requirements of the employment position such individual holds or
desires, and who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of such position.”41 The regulations
themselves list leave as an accommodation: “Other reasonable
accommodations of this type may include . . . providing additional
unpaid leave for necessary treatment.”42
VEVRAA, too, does not prohibit discrimination explicitly, but
rather it requires that federal contracts and subcontracts for the
procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services in
excess of $100,000 contain a provision “requiring that the party
contracting with the United States take affirmative action to employ
and advance in employment qualified covered veterans,”43 where
“qualified” means “having the ability to perform the essential
functions of the position with or without reasonable
accommodation for an individual with a disability,”44 and the
definition of “covered veteran” includes “[d]isabled veterans.”45
Therefore, like section 503 of the Rehab Act, it is by operation of
contract that such federal contractors and subcontractors are barred
from engaging in discrimination based on covered veteran status,
although the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA),46 likely would prohibit such
discrimination as well.47 Moreover, the subset of “[d]isabled
veterans” protected by VEVRAA would almost always be
protected by Title I of the ADA48 and section 503 because the
monetary threshold triggering VEVRAA exceeds that of section
40. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.21(a)(6) (2021) (emphasis added); see also U.S. OFF. OF FED. CONT.
COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 1G04, at 42–43 (2021),
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/OFCCP/FCCM/508_FCCM_05012020.pdf
[hereinafter OFCCP, FCCM].
41. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2(r) (emphases added).
42. Id. pt. 60-741 app. A, § 7.
43. 38 U.S.C. § 4212(a)(1) (emphasis added).
44. Id. § 4212(a)(3)(B) (emphases added).
45. Id. § 4212(a)(3)(A)(i).
46. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149.
47. See 38 U.S.C. § 4311.
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2).
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503.49 As with section 503, the OFCCP administers VEVRAA50 and
has promulgated regulations implementing it stating that
[i]t is unlawful for the contractor to fail to make reasonable
accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an
applicant or employee who is a qualified disabled veteran [among
others], unless such contractor can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of its business.51

In turn, those regulations define “qualified disabled veteran” as
one who “has the ability to perform the essential functions of
the employment position with or without reasonable
accommodation.”52
Furthermore,
like
the
regulations
implementing section 503 of the Rehab Act, VEVRAA’s regulations
explicitly list leave as a permissible accommodation without
clarifying when VEVRAA requires it: “Other reasonable
accommodations of this type may include . . . providing additional
unpaid leave for necessary treatment.”53
Finally, the standards applicable to Title I of the ADA and
sections 501 and 503 of the Rehab Act are materially identical.
Indeed, Title I of the ADA ensures that all complaints filed under it
and operative sections of the Rehab Act are “dealt with in a manner
that . . . prevents imposition of inconsistent or conflicting
standards.”54 Moreover, section 501(a) of the ADA confirms that
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided in [the ADA], nothing in [the
ADA] shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the
standards applied under [the applicable title of the Rehab Act] or
the regulations issued by [f]ederal agencies pursuant to such
title.”55 Similarly, sections 501, 503, and 504 of the Rehab Act state
that the “standards used to determine whether [these sections
have] been violated in a complaint alleging employment
discrimination under [these sections] shall be the standards applied
under title I of the [ADA].”56
49. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 793(a), with 38 U.S.C. § 4212(a)(1).
50. OFCCP, Jurisdiction Thresholds, supra note 39.
51. 41 C.F.R. § 60-300.21(f)(1) (2021) (emphasis added); see also OFCCP, FCCM, supra
note 40, § 1H04, at 48–49.
52. Id. § 60-300.2(s) (emphases added).
53. Id. pt. 60-300 app. A.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b).
55. Id. § 12201(a).
56. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791(f), 793(d), 794(d).
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2. Interpreting the text
In this section, I present four hypothetical employees to whom
I return as touchpoints throughout my analysis: (1) Ada (A), who
works as an inventory stocker and injures her back at work,
exacerbating an undiagnosed condition and forcing her to leave
work immediately, so she cannot work until she undergoes back
surgery and recovers from it several months from now;57 (2) Brenda
(B), who works as an on-air radio personality, gets diagnosed with
an esophageal tumor and needs surgery sometime in the next few
weeks to remove it, during which she would be placed under
general anesthesia, but she can work until her surgery and after a
few months of recovery;58 (3) Carlos (C), who works as a prison
guard, suffers from an anxiety disorder that causes him to suffer a
panic attack at work lasting twenty minutes, rendering him
unexpectedly, temporarily, and completely unable to do his job;59
and 4) Dinesh (D), who works as a design manager, suffers from
bipolar disorder and needs to leave work for a few hours to attend
a single doctor’s appointment sometime in the near future for a
consultation, but he can work until the appointment and after it.60
If accommodating the non-work described in these four
scenarios were reasonable and imposed no undue hardship, and
the employers were covered by a relevant statute (e.g., Title I of the
ADA), a conventional analysis would conclude that employers
must accommodate C (i.e., short-term, involuntary non-work) and
D (i.e., short-term, voluntary61 non-work). Until recently, a
conventional analysis likewise would conclude that the employers
also must accommodate A (i.e., long-term, involuntary non-work)

57. These facts materially track those in Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., 872 F.3d
476 (7th Cir. 2017).
58. These facts materially track those in Soria v. Univision Radio L.A., Inc., Cal. App. 5th
570 (2016), although I added the fact of B being placed under general anesthesia to highlight
an example where an employee can perform the essential functions of the job at the start of
the leave, but physically cannot do so at some point during the leave.
59. These facts materially track those in Smith v. Leis, No. 97-3373, 1998 WL 739881
(6th Cir. Oct. 8, 1998), although I altered the disability from a seizure disorder to an anxiety
disorder to showcase how disabilities rendering employees mentally and/or emotionally
incapacitated are materially identical for our purposes to disabilities rendering employees
physically incapacitated, as with employee A.
60. These facts materially track those in Nieman v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 07-CV-12629,
2008 WL 4940585 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 17, 2008).
61. Later in this section, I contend with the degree to which attending a medically
necessary doctor’s appointment or other similar acts are truly voluntary.
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and B (i.e., long-term non-work, the starting date of which was
discretionary) so long as the employee could identify a return-towork date given that many courts have concluded that indefinite
leave would be unreasonable.62 Recently, however, more and more
courts have held that A and B need not be accommodated on
account of the long-term nature of their leave.63 I contend that the
conventional analysis, as well as the modern gloss thereon
invoking long-term leaves, belies the statutory text. Instead of
accommodating C and D with certainty and potentially
accommodating A and B, I contend that these statutes require
employers to accommodate B and D (i.e., employees taking leaves
with a discretionary start time), subject, as always, to the
reasonableness and undue hardship inquiries, and never require
employers to accommodate A and C (i.e., employees taking leave
involuntarily, regardless of whether that leave is for a few minutes
or several months). Here’s why.
The statutory text of Title I of the ADA limits accommodations
only to “qualified individual[s],” meaning those who “can perform
the essential functions of the [job].”64 The word “can,” as used in this
definition, is a present-tense verb—a present-tense, auxiliary verb
with indicative mood and dynamic modality, to be exact65—used to
express present-tense ability, meaning a qualified individual is one
who presently has the ability to (i.e., can) perform the essential
functions of the job. To that end, in dictionaries published around
the enactment of the ADA, as well as in more-modern dictionaries,
the word “can” is always denoted as being in the present tense and
never in the future tense.66 Put in the terms of the “plain meaning”

62. See, e.g., infra note 176 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., infra notes 179–180, 183, 186, and accompanying text.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (emphases added).
65. García-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 655 (1st Cir. 2000) (O’Toole,
J., dissenting) (citing this language as the present tense and indicative mood); cf. Can, OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH GRAMMAR (2d ed. 2014) (citing as an example of dynamic modality,
“Nadine can read a novel in an evening,” as attributing the ability to read to Nadine)
(emphasis in original); Can, 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (denoting the word
“can” as having the present tense, being an auxiliary verb, and having indicative mood).
66. Can, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010); Can, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2004); 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 65. The
word “can” appears in several editions of Black’s Law Dictionary, but they do not specify its
tense. See Can, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); Can, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th
ed. 1999); Can, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
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doctrine,67 a person can do something if they are able to do it now.
An individual who might, should, or will be able to perform the
essential functions of the job at some time in the future—be that a
few minutes or several months from now—is not a qualified
individual under Title I of the ADA unless that individual presently
can perform the essential functions of the job. Indeed, the ADA
could have defined a qualified individual as “an individual who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can or may be able to
perform the essential functions of the job,” but the ADA does not
say that.
Now, consider this linguistic analysis in the context of an
employee requesting leave as an accommodation. Is a request for
leave, ipso facto, a concession of the employee’s inability to perform
the essential functions of the job presently? In some cases—yes.
Both A and C in the scenarios above cannot work right now. Even
if their employers demanded (cruelly, to be sure) that they work
notwithstanding their disability, they would be unable to comply
on account of a back injury preventing physical work and an
incapacitating panic attack, respectively. Focusing on the text of the
ADA and its use of the present-tense verb “can,” these employees
presently cannot work, meaning they are not “qualified
individual[s]” under the statute at the time that their
accommodation would begin, so their employers need not
accommodate their leave. Yet, not all cases of leave imply a presenttense inability to perform the essential functions of the position.
Indeed, B and D can work now, even if it may be against medical
best practices for them to do so. To that end, B and D both need
time off—several months for B; just a few hours for D—sometime
in the near future (i.e., leave doesn’t need to start right away, in the
strictest sense of the word “need”). Accordingly, B and D can
perform the essential functions of their jobs at the time they would
take leave, even if they choose not to, meaning they are “qualified
individual[s],” so their employers must accommodate them,
subject to the reasonableness and undue hardship inquires. Not all
cases will be as clear cut, thereby necessitating fact finding, but the
boundary between permissible and impermissible leave is the
present-tense ability to perform the essential functions of the job.

67. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 69–77 (2012) (“Words are to be understood in their ordinary, everyday
meanings—unless the context indicates that they bear a technical sense.”).
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One might ask whether the statement, “Can I go to the store
tomorrow?” implies a future-tense ability (i.e., “Yes, you can go to
the store tomorrow.”), thereby undercutting the contention that
“can” always denotes a present-tense ability. As demonstrated by
dictionaries cited herein, the parenthetical reply to my hypothetical
question is, in fact, an expression of a present-tense ability to
undertake a future action (i.e., “Yes, right now, you have the ability
to go to the store tomorrow.”). If you were to ask instead,
“Tomorrow, will I have the ability to go to the store?”, the only
proper response would be, “I don’t know.”
Yet, what legitimate purpose behind the ADA, expressed or
theoretical, could support the inclusion of accommodations for
employees who can work at the time the accommodation would
begin and the exclusion of accommodations for employees who,
potentially through no fault of their own, cannot? I contend that a
preference for the continuity of business operations over flexibility
for employees with a disability is such a purpose. That is, while
section I.B, infra, demonstrates the congressional silence on any
express purpose animating disability leave as an accommodation
that might guide our path, a theoretical purpose behind providing
such leave only to those employees who can work at the time of the
accommodation could be affording flexibility to employees with a
disability only when their employers can be provided enough time
to get their affairs in order before leave begins. After all, before an
employee begins leave, an employer may need to shuffle schedules,
engage temporary replacements, adjust service levels and customer
expectations, and otherwise ensure business continuity during the
leave. Through this lens, A and C—through no fault of their own—
gave their employers no time to ensure that business would carry
on during their leave. In contrast, B and D can work with their
employers and plan to start leave once business continuity is
ensured, presuming that the leave is reasonable and imposes no
undue hardship. Now, does this interpretation provide the optimal
balance of employees’ and employers’ interests? Nowhere near it!
Employers’ interests in ensuring that their business sufficiently
continues during a disability leave should kowtow to their
employees’ interests in taking disability leave, especially when
such leave was necessitated through no fault of the employee. But
such a value judgment is not mine to make. It is what the text
demands, and it is reasonable. That is enough.
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But, can the demarcation that I propose withstand practical
scrutiny? That is, I draw a line at the voluntariness of the leave—
involuntary leaves implying, ipso facto, that the employee suddenly
and unexpectedly cannot perform the essential functions of the
position and is thereby excluded from being a “qualified
individual” under the ADA, and voluntary leaves implying the
opposite, viz., that the employee has the discretion whether to take
leave, meaning the employee can work right now if he or she
chooses. So, are the sorts of leave requested by B and D above truly
voluntary? In a way, no, because they present the employees with
an untenable hard choice of caring for their welfare or working a
job that, in many cases, is necessary for their welfare.
In this way, perhaps it is somewhat involuntary that B and D
take leave, even if the start date and time of that leave remains in
their discretion, which would imply that they, too, cannot perform
the essential functions of their jobs because, at some point, they will
be compelled into non-work by their disability. Does this imply that
Title I of the ADA excludes from its scope all leaves of absence
because no employees needing leave can perform the basic
functions of their jobs? I argue that such an extreme position lacks
logical mooring. Borrowing from the “difficult choice”
voluntariness line of argument from criminal law jurisprudence
and scholarship, “[a] strong, but not completely overpowering,
compulsion is analogous to duress,” which “is not involuntary.”68
Put another way, the decision to continue to work in these cases is
voluntary because it “may be unwilling, but it is not unwilled.”69
Thus, both B and D are voluntarily able to work, meaning they are
qualified individuals, whereas A and C are compelled involuntarily
into non-work, meaning they are not.
Ostensibly, further support for this conclusion can be found in
the EEOC’s enforcement guidance, which provides that, because
“reasonable accommodation is always prospective, an employer is
not required to excuse past misconduct [(e.g., an unapproved
absence)] even if it is the result of the individual’s disability.”70

68. Ian P. Farrell & Justin F. Marceau, Taking Voluntariness Seriously, 54 B.C. L. REV.
1545, 1609 (2013) (italics removed).
69. See Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching
for Its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1360 (1989) (citations omitted).
70. EEOC Accommodation Enforcement Guidance, supra note 24, at 25 ¶ 36.
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Ample case law supports this contention.71 As applied here, the
involuntariness of A and C’s incapacitating leaves implies that they
began their putative accommodations before requesting them,
meaning that any accommodation would necessarily need to be
retroactive. Therefore, one would expect the EEOC to oppose
involuntary leaves as an accommodation.
However, confusingly, the EEOC’s enforcement guidance cites
at least two cases putatively involving involuntary leaves as
examples of where an employer should have provided leave as
an accommodation.72 In all likelihood, the EEOC excused the
involuntariness of these leaves and the retrospective nature of the
accommodation because the employers clearly knew that the
employees had a disability, could not work on account of it, and
could not request the necessary accommodation prior to availing
themselves of it.73 Thus, I would not point to the statements
made by the EEOC and these courts opposing retroactive
accommodations as support for my thesis as they could
counterargue that what they really meant was that accommodations
are not required when employers lack knowledge of an employee’s
disability, the employee’s inability to work, and the employee’s
inability to request an accommodation because of that disability.
Instead, I reiterate that the permissible purpose animating my
reconceived analytic of the ADA (i.e., ensuring the continuity of
business operations) also animates the gut instinct of the EEOC and
these courts—an instinct supported only by policy considerations

71. Dewitt v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 845 F.3d 1299, 1316 (10th Cir. 2017); McElwee v. Cnty.
of Orange, 700 F.3d 635, 641 (2d Cir. 2012); Hill v. Kansas City Area Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d
891, 894 (8th Cir. 1999); Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 319 (5th Cir. 1997); Siefken v.
Vill. of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 666–67 (7th Cir. 1995); Isley v. Aker Phila. Shipyard,
Inc., 275 F. Supp. 3d 620, 631 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
72. EEOC Accommodation Enforcement Guidance, supra note 24, at 16 n.55 (citing
Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 128 F.3d 1194 (7th Cir. 1997)), 18 n.63, 24 n.98 (citing
Ralph v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 135 F.3d 166 (1st Cir. 1998)). According to the district court
opinion in Matthews, the plaintiff “suffered a severe heart attack and was forced to leave
ComEd temporarily due to his medical condition.” Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison Co.,
941 F. Supp. 721, 722–23 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (emphasis added). In Ralph, the plaintiff was
accommodated with four weeks of part-time work due to a “mental breakdown” that
rendered him “able to attend work only briefly [thereafter].” Ralph, 135 F.3d at 168 (emphasis
added). Oddly, the EEOC cited to Ralph, a case involving a part-time work schedule
accommodation, in support of leave as an accommodation.
73. Cf. EEOC Accommodation Enforcement Guidance, supra note 24, 26–27 ¶ 40
(relating these elements as the conditions under which employees need not initiate a request
for an accommodation).
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and not by any citations to statutory text, I note—that the ADA does
not require retroactive accommodations.
The EEOC regulations implementing Title I of the ADA support
the notion that some leaves may qualify as accommodations
whereas other leaves may not. Indeed, the regulations provide only
that an employee “may need leave . . . to permit him or her to attend
follow-up or ‘monitoring’ appointments with a health care
provider”74 (as was the case for employee D and which I contend
the statute already mandated without the need of such a regulation)
and that “an employer . . . may, in appropriate circumstances, have
to consider the provision of leave to an employee with a disability
as a reasonable accommodation, unless the provision of leave
would impose an undue hardship.”75 The second of these
regulations should be read not only as permitting the interpretation
that I have forwarded, as the first regulation does, but as
supporting it. Under a conventional analysis, an employer must
accommodate an employee with disability leave if it is reasonable
and imposes no undue burden. However, this regulation presumes
a leave that is both reasonable and imposes no undue hardship, and
yet it does not say that the employer must provide such an
accommodation; it says an employer “may, in appropriate
circumstances,” need to do so. The only plausible reading of this
regulation is that reasonable leaves that impose no undue hardship
sometimes are permissible (e.g., when the employee presently can
perform the essential functions of the position) and, other times, are
impermissible (e.g., when the employee cannot).
Some courts have invoked the “essential functions” language
from Title I of the ADA to reach a similar end, concluding that
“regular and reliable attendance is an essential function of most
jobs,” in which cases the employees requesting leave are unqualified
and leave cannot be an accommodation.76 On the other hand, the
EEOC and a minority of courts have held that, in all circumstances,
attendance “is not an essential function as defined by the ADA

74. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(3) (2021) (emphasis added) (quotations in original).
75. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.15(b)–(c) (“Disparate Impact Defenses”).
76. Rachel L. Berry & Sara J. Robertson, Four Circuits Agree: Regular and Reliable Attendance
Is an Essential Job Function, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/
article/four-circuits-agree-regular-and-reliable-attendance-essential-job-function (collecting
cases); accord Franklin J. Rooks, Jr., Employee Absences and the Americans with Disabilities Act,
32 J. MED. PRAC. MGMT. 98, 99 (2016) (“Leave as a reasonable accommodation would seem to
run contrary to the assertion that regular attendance is an essential job function.”).
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because it is not one of ‘the fundamental job duties of the
employment position.’”77 Respectfully, these courts and the EEOC
are engaging in a debate with a flawed premise, rendering the
debate itself moot. Title I of the ADA defines a “qualified
individual” as one who “can perform the essential functions of the
employment position,”78 even if the employee is not performing
those essential functions at present because the employee is on
leave. The debate over regular attendance as an essential function
of the job makes sense only if we replace the word “can” in the
statute with the word “will.” If we ask whether an employee will
perform the essential functions of the job while on leave, the
obvious answer is, “no, the employee will not work during
non-work (i.e., while on leave).” This truism leads the EEOC to note
that “essential functions,” is undefined by Title I of the ADA,
meaning the agency’s regulations interpreting that phrase as “the
fundamental job duties of the employment position”79 should be
given controlling deference. From those accurate statements, the
EEOC argues that “job duties” presumes that the employee is
working in the first place, so attendance cannot be an essential
function of any job, meaning a lack of attendance cannot be
grounds upon which to construe an employee as being unqualified.
In other words, as per the EEOC, the employee will perform the
essential functions of the job after the leave. Both sides of this
debate are wrong. Having the ability to perform and performing
are different things. We need not ask whether an employee on leave
will be performing the “essential functions” of the job after the
leave, necessitating an interpretation of what “essential functions”
means; we need only ask whether an employee who takes leave can
perform the essential function of the job, even if the employee
chooses not to do so.
I also want to address a potential ambiguity uncovered by my
analysis. I argue that, in the scenarios above, both B and D must be
accommodated with leave. There is no doubt that D, who is taking
leave to attend a doctor’s appointment, can perform the essential
77. EEOC Accommodation Enforcement Guidance, supra note 24, at 18 n.65 (quoting
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)); see generally James A. Passamano, Employee Leave Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Family Medical Leave Act, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 861 (1997);
Audrey E. Smith, The “Presence Is an Essential Function” Myth: The ADA’s Trapdoor for the
Chronically Ill, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 163 (1995).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (emphasis added).
79. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1).
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duties of the job at all times during his leave. He is never
incapacitated. He remains lucid and able-bodied. He could,
theoretically, be called into work at the drop of a hat to perform the
essential functions of his job, and he would be able to comply.
Indeed, D would be just as able to work during his doctor’s
appointment as an employee asleep in bed at night, away from the
office, who uses a screen reading tool to accommodate his poor
vision at the office. They both can work, even if they are not doing
so presently, so they both remain qualified. Not so with B. Recall
that B needs to take leave to undergo tumor-removal surgery and
recovery. While she can perform the essential functions of her job
now and at all times leading up to the leave, as well as when she
concludes her recovery, there will, at least, be a period of time
during her leave when she will be under anesthesia and literally
unable to work, if she were asked to do so. Parts of her recovery
may also render her physically, mentally, or emotionally incapable
of coming to work and doing her job, even if she were compelled
to try. How, then, does she remain a “qualified individual”
throughout the life of her accommodation?
To answer that question, consider another hypothetical
employee, Elie (E), who works as a soccer coach and develops
migraines if she is overly exposed to sunlight. Her employer
accommodates her by allowing her to coach only indoor games
inside a company-operated building abutting some outdoor fields.
However, after her employer’s profits decline, it forfeits its lease of
the building, forcing it to operate only on the outdoor fields,
potentially forcing it to terminate E because she cannot work
outside for long periods of time.80 Although E was able to perform
the essential functions of the job at the start of her accommodation,
that changed during the life of the accommodation. She went from
being qualified to being unqualified. As such, E’s employer would
be within its rights to terminate her employment after losing the
ability to let her work indoors, assuming, of course, that it
sufficiently engaged in the interactive process to try to otherwise
accommodate E, but failed. Would the same not be true of B? B also
went from being qualified to being unqualified during the life of
80. This employer would be obligated to engage in an interactive process to attempt
other means of accommodating E such as part-time work, installing structures that provide
shade, allowing E to coach pre-dawn or post-dusk games, etc. Assume, for argument’s sake,
that the employer engaged in this process and attempted to accommodate E in good faith,
but failed.
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her accommodation—that is, when B went under anesthesia during
surgery, could not leave her bed post-surgery, and was otherwise
incapacitated during her leave. During those times, B could not have
performed the essential functions of her job. In that case, would B’s
employer be legally obligated to accommodate her by providing
her leave to start her surgery, knowing full-well that it could
terminate her as soon as she went under anesthesia? Similarly, must
an employer accommodate a nurse with Alzheimer’s disease who
needs an early shift to avoid sundowning81 (i.e., a modified work
schedule) knowing full-well that it could rescind that
accommodation after his shift ends at the point when he
experiences sundowning and, therefore, cannot perform the
essential functions of his job?
Of course not! It would be patently absurd to require an
employer to provide leave to an employee when both the employer
and the employee know with certainty that, during that life of that
leave, the employer could lawfully be permitted to rescind it and
fire the employee. To be clear, it would be reasonable, albeit
ill-advised, to craft a law that does not require an employer to
accommodate an employee with any disability leave at all if the
employee would, during that leave, be unable to perform the
essential functions of that position; perhaps the legislature values
an employer’s ability to force employees to work over the needs of
employees with a disability, for example. Conversely, it would also
be reasonable, and a good idea, for a law to require an employer to
accommodate an employee with disability leave even if the
employee will or may become unable to perform the job during the
leave. What is unreasonable and something that no reasonable
legislature could have intended is requiring an employer to allow
disability leave to begin when that employer can fire the employee
during the pendency of that leave.
In cases where the text of a statute yields such ambiguity, we
must turn to administrative agency guidance for aid. See, infra
section I.A.3, for my analysis of deference to the EEOC here,
which ultimately concludes that Title I of the ADA, as interpreted
in the EEOC’s subregulatory guidance, requires leave as an

81. Sundowning: Late-Day Confusion, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/
diseases-conditions/alzheimers-disease/expert-answers/sundowning/faq-20058511 (last
visited Feb. 22, 2021).
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accommodation in cases like that of B, who is qualified when her
leave begins but becomes unqualified during that leave.
However, that is not to say that employers must continue to
provide disability leave when the employee becomes unable to
perform the essential functions of the job during the leave and there
is no reasonable possibility of that employee ever being able to do
so again. In such cases, employees may want to remain employed
not because of the prospect of returning to work, but because
employee benefits may extend to an employee on disability leave,
depending on how the employer treats employees taking similar
leaves,82 and employees may want to remain employed to honestly
list continued employment on their résumés. However, it would be
unreasonable to require an employer to accommodate an employee
in this manner when there is no reasonable chance of the employee
working for that employer ever again. Note that this differs in
degree from employees who request indefinite leave but who may
be able to return to work eventually.83
I will note, for the sake of completeness, that one may be drawn
to criticize the thesis of this Article on the grounds that it
(1) perversely encourages employees to try to work even if they
should be treating their disability instead and (2) appears to
perversely authorize employers to encourage employees to delay
the start of their voluntary disability leave, which would often
mean delaying necessary or recommended medical treatment. I
wholeheartedly agree with the first criticism. Under my analysis,
employees with a disability would be encouraged to try to prove
an ability to work just so they can qualify for leave. For example, in
the scenarios above, A might try to grit and bear it by coming into
work despite excruciating back pain to ensure that she earns the
right to take leave (lest she be designated unable to perform her job
and lose that right), possibly exacerbating her condition in the
process. It is awful public policy to discourage the medical
treatment of disabilities and encourage employees to make them
worse in the name of business continuity. However, it is reasonable
82. Amber Clayton, When Do Group Health Plan Benefits Terminate for an Employee
Who Is Not on Federal Family and Medical Leave Act Leave?, HR MAG. (July 2014),
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/hr-qa/pages/
whendogrouphealthplanbenefitsterminateforanemployeeonanonfmlaleaveofabsence.aspx
(“If an employee is on leave as a reasonable accommodation under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), an employer must continue an employee’s health insurance benefits
during the leave if it does so for other employees on similar leave.”).
83. See, e.g., infra note 176 and accompanying text.
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to come to such a conclusion, and democracy demands adherence
to laws borne of awful public policy.
That said, I disagree with the second criticism. My thesis
advances no such incentive because the ADA already permits
employers to provide an alternative accommodation that meets the
needs, not the wants, of the employee.84 As perverse as it may
sound, an employer already can delay an employee’s requested
start date for disability leave so long as that start date sufficiently
accommodates the employee’s disability; the employer does not
even need to point to the requested start date imposing an undue
hardship to effectuate such a delay. As the EEOC’s enforcement
guidance states, “If there are two possible reasonable
accommodations, and one costs more or is more burdensome than
the other, the employer may choose the less expensive or
burdensome accommodation as long as it is effective . . . .”85
One final corollary of my argument deserves attention. The
FMLA affords to eligible employees the right to take twelve weeks
of leave “[b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the
employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such
employee.”86 The italicized language including employees within
the FMLA’s scope is materially identical to the language excluding
employees from the ADA’s scope. Hence, employees taking FMLA
leave for their own serious health condition are, by their own
admission, “unable to perform the functions of the position,”
meaning they are “unqualified individual[s]” under the ADA. This
is true regardless of whether they have a “disability” or not.87
Therefore, the commonly accepted belief that reasonable ADA
leave that imposes no undue hardship must be tacked on to the end
of FMLA leave based on an employee’s serious health condition88
84. EEOC Accommodation Enforcement Guidance, supra note 24, at 9 ¶ 9 (“The
employer may choose among reasonable accommodations as long as the chosen accommodation
is effective.”).
85. Id.
86. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (emphasis added).
87. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 825.102 (2021) (defining “serious health condition”), with 42
U.S.C. § 12102(1) (defining “disability”). See also 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(b) (explaining the relevant
interaction between the FMLA and ADA).
88. EEOC’s ADA Leave Website, supra note 24 (example 11); Tracie DeFreitas, ADA
Leave Beyond FMLA, 12 JOB ACCOMMODATION NETWORK, no. 3, 2014 https://askjan.org/
articles/ADA-Leave-Beyond-FMLA.cfm (last visited Feb. 22, 2021). ADA leave would not
commonly follow other forms of FMLA leave (e.g., leave for childbirth or caring for certain
family members with a serious health condition) because the employee would not
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is wrong. As demonstrated herein, because such an employee
would not be able to work at the start of the accommodation
(i.e., the end of the FMLA leave), the employee is unqualified for an
accommodation. I justify such a categorical conclusion as
reasonable based on business continuity rationales similar to the
rationale that could justify my thesis. Employees taking
involuntary FMLA leave for their own serious health condition,
which is permitted since FMLA leave can be designated
retroactively,89 certainly invoke such a rationale. The employer
cannot ensure continuity of business operations if an employee
leaves involuntarily to take FMLA leave; tacking ADA leave on to
the end of that leave merely makes things worse for the employer.
Moreover, reasonable legislators could view employees taking
voluntary FMLA leave for their own serious health condition as
telling their employers to plan for twelve week of leave and no
more; legislators could consider leave as an accommodation
beyond those twelve weeks to be less valuable than an employer’s
right to fill the position permanently. Such purposes unjustly tip
the scales too far in favor of management at employees’ expense,
but such poorly conceived value judgments are reasonable in
and of themselves, and the statutory text requires as much, so we
must acquiesce.
With this reconceived analytic of the ADA in mind, consider the
remainder of the federal disability accommodation statutes. Per the
statutory text of all operative sections of the Rehab Act, the
standards used to assess violations of the Rehab Act are the same
as those applied under Title I of the ADA,90 and, lest there be
any doubt, the regulations implementing section 503 limit
accommodations only to “qualified individual[s],” meaning those
who “can perform the essential functions of such position.”91 As
such, an employee who cannot work and requests leave is also not
qualified under any section of the Rehab Act, meaning employers
need not accommodate the request. The regulations implementing

necessarily have a disability triggering the ADA’s accommodation requirements. However,
an employee taking FMLA leave for such reasons who is also unable to work (e.g., an
employee who develops incapacitating postpartum depression midway through her twelve
weeks of FMLA childbirth leave) would likewise be (cruelly) unqualified for ADA leave after
the FMLA leave concludes.
89. 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(d).
90. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117(b), 12201(a); 29 U.S.C. §§ 791(f), 793(d), 794(d).
91. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2(r) (emphases added).
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section 503 of the Rehab Act, like those implementing Title I of the
ADA, do not alter this analysis as they state that leave may be an
accommodation, but do not clarify when.92
The text of VEVRAA limits accommodations only to “qualified
covered veterans,” meaning individuals “having the ability to
perform the essential functions of the position.”93 As used in the
statutory text, “having” is either a present participle verb or a
gerund noun.94 In either sense, the word “having” must be
construed in the present tense either explicitly (as a present
participle verb) or impliedly (as a gerund noun) because, at the
time an employee would need leave, that employee cannot be
amongst those individuals “having” the ability to perform the
essential functions of the position. In a similar vein, VEVRAA’s
implementing regulations confirm that “qualified” means one who
“has the ability to perform the essential functions of the
employment position.”95 As used in the regulatory text, “has” is
the third-person singular conjugation of the verb “to have” in the
present tense and indicative mood, meaning to presently possess
the ability, as an attribute, quality, faculty, or function.96 Once
again, the statutory and regulatory texts’ use of present-tense
verbs or gerund nouns mean that employees who cannot work
and request leave are not “qualified” under the statutes and
regulations. Finally, like the regulations implementing section
503 of the Rehab Act, the regulations implementing VEVRAA
confirm this Article’s thesis as they list leave as a permissible
accommodation without clarifying the conditions under which it is
permissible.97 For these reasons, under VEVRAA, just as with Title
92. 41 C.F.R. pt. 60-741 app. A, § 7.
93. 38 U.S.C. § 4212(a)(3)(B) (emphases added).
94. Compare Having, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002)
(defining “having” as a present participle verb), and Having, 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
supra note 65 (same), with Devon Balwit, How to Use “Being” and “Having” as Gerunds,
PORTLAND ENG. LANGUAGE ACAD., https://portlandenglish.edu/blog/how-to-use-beingand-having-as-gerunds/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2021) (defining “having” as a gerund
noun), and Martine Johnston, Using Gerunds and Infinitives, UNIV. OF TORONTO,
https://advice.writing.utoronto.ca/english-language/gerunds/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2021)
(same). See also CAMBRIDGE GRAMMAR OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1220–22 (Cambridge
Univ. Press. 2002) (English lacks a material distinction between present participle verbs and
gerund nouns).
95. 41 C.F.R. § 60-300.2(s) (emphases added).
96. Has, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY, supra note 66; Has, 6 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, supra note 65; Have, 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 65.
97. 41 C.F.R. pt. 60-300 app. A, § 7.
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I of the ADA and all relevant sections of the Rehab Act, employers
need not accommodate disability leave when the employee
presently cannot work.
Accordingly, when it comes to an employee’s ability to work,
there are two requirements imposed by the federal disability
accommodation statutes—requirements implied by the title of this
Article. An employee must be able to work now (i.e., the presenttense ability to perform the essential functions of the job) and again
(i.e., a reasonable likelihood of the ability to work again eventually,
but not necessarily soon). These two requirements, when
considered in tandem with the reasonableness and undue hardship
inquiries, constitute the textually accurate analytical framework for
disability leave as an accommodation under federal law.
3. Heeding the guidance
Administrative agencies like the EEOC and the OFCCP are
entitled to a certain level of deference to their interpretations of the
statutes that they administer so long as Congress has not spoken
directly on the issue at hand and, in cases of statutory silence or
ambiguity, as long as the interpretation is permissible.98 Assuming
congressional silence or statutory ambiguity and a permissive
agency interpretation, the level of deference owed to the agency
is absolute where the agency’s interpretation carries the force of
law (e.g., via congressionally authorized regulations) (Chevron
deference),99 whereas deference owed to the agency is lesser—more
akin to a court considering persuasive authority—where its
interpretation does not carry the force of law (e.g., agency websites,
enforcement guidance, technical assistance manuals, regulations
promulgated absent congressional authority) (Skidmore deference
or Skidmore weight).100
Recall that Title I of the ADA, the Rehab Act, and VEVRAA
compel four conclusions elucidated by the four hypothetical
employees: A and C (i.e., employees taking involuntary leave) are
not qualified individuals, meaning employers need not
98. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
99. Id.; see also Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
100. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944), superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in Bridges v. Empire Scaffold, LLC, 875 F.3d 222, 228 (5th Cir. 2017); see also
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083,
1188 (2008).
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accommodate them with leave, whereas B and D (i.e., employees
taking voluntary leave, at least at the time the leave starts) are
qualified individuals, meaning they qualify for leave as an
accommodation. Everyone agrees that the law may require leave as
an accommodation for D, so I’ll proceed to the trickier cases.
Regarding employees A and C, deference would be irrelevant
with respect to the EEOC’s regulations implementing Title I of
the ADA and the OFCCP’s regulations implementing section 503
of the Rehab Act and VEVRAA as those regulations merely restate
what the statutes already imply—viz., that leave can be an
accommodation some of the time.101 To that end, none of these
regulations say when leave is a required accommodation.
Accordingly, any regulatory deference notwithstanding, my
conclusion vis-à-vis employees A and C remains untouched so
far. Conflict only arises regarding A and C upon review of the
EEOC’s subregulatory enforcement guidance, which does not
carry the force of law,102 yet contends that involuntary leaves such
as these may nonetheless qualify as an accommodation. To be
clear, that guidance does not explicitly state that “involuntary
leaves do not render an employee unqualified” or anything of the
sort, but the guidance cites at least two cases involving involuntary
leaves as examples of employers that should have provided leave
as an accommodation.103 The EEOC’s website on accommodating

101. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(k)(3); id. pt. 1630 app. § 16.30.15(b)–(c); 41 C.F.R. pt. 60-741
app. A, § 7; id. pt. 60-300 app. A, § 7; see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(b). The DOL, an agency
without Congressional authority to promulgate regulations interpreting the ADA, has
similarly endorsed disability leave as an accommodation generally in a regulation
implementing the FMLA—”the ADA allows an indeterminate amount of leave, barring
undue hardship, as a reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(b).
102. See Townsend v. Benjamin Enters., Inc., 679 F.3d 41, 53 (2d Cir. 2012); EEOC v. U.S.
Steel Corp., No. 10-1284, 2013 WL 625315, at *21 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2013). The EEOC’s
regulations implementing Title I of the ADA, on the other hand, do carry the force of law.
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 478–79 (1999), superseded by statute on other
grounds, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). Some
courts have also opined that “[d]eference to the EEOC regulations [implementing Title I of
the ADA] is also appropriate when reviewing claims brought under [the federal employment
provisions of] the Rehabilitation Act,” Badwal v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of D.C., 139 F. Supp. 3d
295, 308 n.9 (D.D.C. 2015) (citation omitted), and that the OFCCP’s regulations implementing
section 503 of the Rehab Act carry the force of law, Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc.
v. Shiu, 30 F. Supp. 3d 25, 35 (D.D.C. 2014), aff’d, 773 F.3d 257 (D.C. Cir. 2014), whereas no
court has considered the level of deference owed to VEVRAA’s implementing regulations.
However, given that deference to any regulations carrying the force of law is unnecessary
here, I decline to analyze these lines of cases further.
103. See supra note 72.
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leave buttresses those citations with an example involving
involuntary leave.104
Yet, even if we give the EEOC the benefit of the doubt and
construe its subregulatory guidance as opposing my conclusions
with respect to A and C, it would not matter. Because the relevant
statutes exclude employees who take involuntary leaves from the
definition of who is “qualified” for accommodations for the reasons
explained, supra, those statutes have not “explicitly left a gap for an
agency to fill,”105 meaning agency guidance endorsing such leave
as an accommodation is impermissible, and there is no need to
weigh the degree of Skidmore deference or weight owed to such
guidance. Similarly, even if the EEOC were to promulgate revised
regulations permitting involuntary leave as an accommodation,
they would fail under Chevron for lack of permissibility given the
statutory text to the contrary. If these statutes were lacking in such
exclusionary language, courts would likely still give the EEOC’s
enforcement guidance some weight because, “while not controlling
upon the courts by reason of [its] authority, [it] do[es] constitute a
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance.”106 However, because
there are no statutory gaps here, the EEOC’s subregulatory
guidance, like its regulations, are moot.
Regarding employee B, none of the regulations cited herein
clarify whether leave can be an accommodation for an employee
who takes leave that starts out as voluntary but during which the
employee is rendered completely unable to perform the essential
functions of the job. The regulations merely state that leave can be
an accommodation without clarifying when. Once again, it is not
until we review subregulatory enforcement guidance that we
discern some degree of clarity, even if we must dig to find it once
again. In its enforcement guidance, the EEOC fails to explicitly
104. EEOC’s ADA Leave Website, supra note 24 (example 11).
105. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984);
accord United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001).
106. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Theoretically, the EEOC would
not be entitled to deference to its interpretation of section 503 of the Rehab Act because it
does not administer that statute, and the EEOC does not purport to interpret VEVRAA.
However, if courts were to defer to the EEOC’s subregulatory guidance addressing Title I of
the ADA, section 503 of the Rehab Act contains language confirming that it is to be
interpreted under the same standards as Title I of the ADA, 29 U.S.C. § 793(d), so any
theoretical lapse in Skidmore deference or weight owed to the EEOC regarding its
interpretation of section 503 would be moot.
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support the belief that the law requires employers to accommodate
leaves that start out voluntary during which the employee may or
will become unable to work; after all, the EEOC does not contend
that employees’ present-tense ability to work matters, so why
would it cite such examples?107 However, as I noted in the
preceding paragraph, that guidance cites at least two cases
involving involuntary leaves as examples of where employers
should have provided leave as an accommodation, plus a similar
example from the EEOC’s website, meaning the employees in
those situations were unable to perform the essential functions
of the position at the start of the leave and at some time during
that leave, if not throughout the leave entirely. It is the latter part
of that proposition that carries us across the finish line, albeit
barely. The EEOC posits that the law requires leave as an
accommodation even when the employee is unable to do the job
during the leave—precisely the situation that faces employee B.
Because the statute itself is ambiguous concerning employees that
start out qualified but become unqualified during their leave, and
the regulations also offer no clarity, we must defer, per Skidmore, to
guidance suggesting that the law requires leave as an
accommodation even when an employee is unqualified at some
time during the leave of absence, subject to the reasonableness
and undue hardship inquiries. After all, generally, the greater (i.e.,
belief that leave may be required when an employee is unable to
perform the essential functions of the position at the start of the
leave and during leave) includes the lesser (i.e., belief that leave
may be required when an employee cannot perform the essential
functions of the position during leave).108 Accordingly, to be clear,
we must defer to the EEOC’s enforcement guidance as applied
to employee B only because the statute and the regulations
are ambiguous; where the statutes and regulations are clear, as
they are when applied to employees A and C, such deference is
not warranted.

107. The EEOC does state that leave “is a form of reasonable accommodation when
necessitated by an employee’s disability,” EEOC Accommodation Enforcement Guidance,
supra note 24, at 14 (emphasis added), but the voluntary leave taken by B, during which she
would be under general anesthesia, is also necessitated by her disability. The necessity of the
leave does not necessarily imply an inability to work at some point during leave.
108. See Michael Herz, Justice Byron White and the Argument that the Greater Includes the
Lesser, 1994 BYU L. REV. 227 (1994).
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To be fair, the EEOC could state its position with far-greater
clarity as one could argue, rightly, I might add, that the EEOC is
silent on leave as an accommodation when an employee is qualified
at the beginning of a leave and becomes unqualified during its
pendency. However, beggars can’t be choosers. Unless and until
the EEOC promulgates contradictory regulations or issues
alternative guidance, there is no further clarity vis-à-vis employee
B to be gleaned in any source beyond a pure appeal to sound public
policy, which I argue supports providing disability leave to all
employees who need it anyway, not just those like employee B.
It is worth briefly analyzing the provision in the ADA that
purports to subsume, as part of its statutory text, regulations issued
by agencies interpreting the Rehab Act. As you may recall, section
501(a) of the ADA states that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in
[the ADA], nothing in [the ADA] shall be construed to apply a
lesser standard than the standards applied under [the applicable
title of the Rehab Act] or the regulations issued by [f]ederal agencies
pursuant to such title.”109 On its face, section 501(a) of the ADA
purports to elevate the regulations promulgated by the OFCCP—for
example, the regulation construing leave as an accommodation
under section 503 of the Rehab Act110—to the same level as a statute,
thereby creating an ostensible right for the OFCCP to promulgate
new regulations permitting involuntary leave as an
accommodation under section 503 and imbue such regulations with
the force of a statute.
However, Congress cannot delegate legislative power to an
agency to exercise an “unfettered discretion” to create laws.111 In
contrast, “[i]f Congress shall lay down by legislative act an
intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to
[interpret it] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not
a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”112 Section 501(a) of
the ADA offers no such intelligible principle. Rather, because
it ostensibly vests with an agency the legislative authority
delegated only to Congress by Article I of the Constitution, the
109. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (emphasis added).
110. 41 C.F.R. pt. 60-741 app. A, § 7 (2021).
111. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537–38 (1935).
112. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); see also Whitman
v. Am. Trucking Assocs., 531 U.S. 457, 458 (2001) (“An agency cannot cure an unlawful
delegation of legislative power by adopting in its discretion a limiting construction of
the statute.”).
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provision of section 501(a) of the ADA that purports to elevate
agency regulations to the level of a statute is unconstitutional.
Indeed, as Justice Scalia once noted, “A law that simply stated ‘it
shall be unlawful to do ‘X’, however ‘X’ shall be defined by an
independent agency,’ would seem to offer no ‘intelligible principle’
to guide the agency’s discretion and would thus raise very serious
delegation concerns . . . .”113
B. Legislative History
Legislative history confirms that leave can be an
accommodation at least some of the time, but that history fails to
clarify when. To that end, I proceed chronologically in analyzing
the history of the Rehab Act (1973), VEVRAA (1974), and finally the
ADA (1990) to explain whether and when Congress believed that
leave could be an accommodation.
Both the Rehab Act and VEVRAA have their roots in helping
American soldiers with a disability integrate back into civilian life
after returning from war. After World War I, the 65th Congress
passed and President Wilson signed the first federal law to provide
help to employees with a disability, the Vocational Rehabilitation
Act of 1918,114 which assisted veterans in dealing with their
disabilities when they came home.115 The new law proved so
successful that federally funded programs for veterans with a
disability continued to expand throughout the twentieth century116
leading up to March 1, 1971, when Sen. Jennings Randolph
introduced a new bill that would ultimately replace the Vocational
Rehabilitation Act of 1918—the Rehab Act.117 In 1972 and then
again in early 1973, Congress passed similar versions of the bill that
would ultimately become the Rehab Act only to have President
Nixon veto both of them,118 leading to protests in Washington.119 A
113. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 695 n.10 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (citing J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., 276 U.S. at 409).
114. Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-178, 40 Stat. 617 (1918).
115. 1 HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT HANDBOOK 490–91
(4th ed. 2003).
116. Id.
117. S. 1030, 92d Cong. (1971).
118. Vetoes by President Richard Nixon, U.S. SENATE https://www.senate.gov/
reference/Legislation/Vetoes/NixonR.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2021) (citing vetoes of S.7,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. and H.R. 8395, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.).
119. Disabled Tie Up Traffic Here to Protest Nixon Aid‐Bill Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1972,
at 43.
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few months later, in 1973, after further wrangling between
Congress and the White House, Congress passed and President
Nixon finally signed the Rehab Act.120
Since the Rehab Act’s enactment in 1973, sections 501 and 503
have been amended multiple times.121 Yet, nowhere in the
legislative history of the Rehab Act or its amendments does a
legislator or congressional report state or suggest, even once, that
leaves of absence are accommodations required by the Rehab Act
(or its regulations, for that matter). On the contrary, legislators and
congressional reports sometimes listed the sort of accommodations
that sections 501 and 503 of the Rehab Act and/or its regulations
ostensibly require without listing leave as an example.122
Occasionally, legislators and their witnesses at hearings stated that
sections 501 and 503 and/or their regulations generally required
accommodations,123 but no one argued that leave may be required
as an accommodation. In hearings on Rehab Act amendments,

120. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973).
121. Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-128, Title IV,
§ 456(a), 128 Stat. 1675; Rosa’s Law of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-256, § 2(d)(3), 124 Stat. 2643;
Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-435, Title VI, § 604(d),
120 Stat. 3242; Workforce Investment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-220, Title III, § 341(c), Title
IV, § 408(a)(1), 112 Stat. 1092, 1202; Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-73, Title I, § 112(a), 107 Stat. 727; Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-569, Title I, § 102(p)(29), (31), Title V, §§ 503, 505, 106 Stat. 4360, 4424, 4427; Veterans
Housing, Memorial Affairs, and Technical Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-54,
§ 13(k)(1)(B), 105 Stat. 276; Handicapped Programs Technical Amendments Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-630, Title II, § 206(a), (c), 102 Stat. 3310, 3312; Rehabilitation Act Amendments of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, Title I, § 103(d)(2)(B), (C), Title X, §§ 1001(f)(1)–(3), 1002(e)(1),
(e)(2)(A), (e)(3), 100 Stat. 1810, 1843, 1844; Rehabilitation Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-221, Title I, § 104(b)(3), 98 Stat. 18; Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and
Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, Title I, § 122(d)(1),
92 Stat. 2987.
122. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 102-357, at 78; 138 CONG. REC. S16608-05, S16611 (1992),
(statement of Sen. Tom Harkin).
123. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 98-298, at 13 (“[C]ontractors are required . . . to make
accommodations to the disabilities of employees or applicants unless undue hardship would
result . . . .”); Oversight Hearings on Rehabilitation of the Handicapped Programs and the
Implementation of Same by Agencies Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 Before the S. Subcomm.
on the Handicapped of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong. 1593 (1976) (statement
of Lawrence Z. Lorber, Deputy Asst. Sec’y Dir., OFCCP) (“[Under ‘our new regulations,’
[c]ontractors are also required to make reasonable accommodations to workers’ handicaps.”);
121 CONG. REC. 32911, 32913 (1975) (statement of Sen. Chris Dodd) (“[The DOL] issued
regulations (20 C.F.R. [§] 741) . . . to implement section 503. . . . The regulations require, [i]n
part, that . . . [f]ederal contractors and subcontractors with contracts exceeding $2,500 take
affirmative action to employ and advance [i]n employment qualified handicapped persons,
[i]ncluding . . . actions to accommodate physical and mental limitations of employees.”).
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some witnesses listed accommodations to which employees with a
disability should be legally entitled, including leave,124 and
accommodations that employers have provided to employees
irrespective of legal obligations (which sometimes included leave125
and sometimes did not126). However, nowhere will you find a
legislator, or anyone else for that matter throughout this entire
legislative history, opining that the Rehab Act and/or its
regulations require employers to provide disability leave as an
accommodation even some of the time. Rather, on multiple
occasions, the same Congresses that passed substantive
amendments to sections 501 and 503 of the Rehab Act failed to pass
bills that would have explicitly required certain employers to
provide leave to certain employees.127
The lack of any legislator citing leave as an accommodation
throughout the history of sections 501 and 503 of the Rehab Act and
its amendments offers no guidance as “congressional silence lacks
persuasive significance.”128 In contrast, Congress’s failure to pass
explicit employee leave bills during the sessions in which it
considered substantive amendments to the Rehab Act arguably
supports the conclusion that the statutory text of the Rehab Act does
not require leave as an accommodation under any circumstances.
124. See, e.g., Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on the Select Education of the Comm. on
Education and Labor, 99th Cong. 105 (statement of Barbara Hoffman, Esq., Foundation for
Dignity, Cancer Patients Employment Rights Project) (“Employees who are undergoing
treatment for cancer may need a leave of absence or reduced work hours.”).
125. See, e.g., Field Hearing on Reauthorization of the Rehabilitation Act Before the H.
Subcomm. on Select Education of the Comm. on Education and Labor, 102d Cong. 57, 61 (statement
of Rehabilitation Specialist and Caregiver Jacqueline Rotteveel).
126. See, e.g., Oversight and Reauthorization Hearing on the Rehabilitation Act of 1983 Before
the H. Subcomm. on Select Education of the Comm. on Education and Labor, 98th Cong. 295–96
(1983) (statement of the United Cerebral Palsy Association, Inc.).
127. An earlier version of the FMLA was introduced in and passed by the 102nd
Congress but was vetoed by President George H.W. Bush. Family and Medical Leave Act,
S. 5, 102d Cong. (1991). This is the same Congress to pass the Rehabilitation Act Amendments
of 1992, H.R. 5482, 102d Cong., which amended sections 501 and 503 of the Rehab Act when
President Bush signed it into law, Pub. L. No. 102-569, 106 Stat. 4344. A bill that would have
“[e]ntitle[d] employees to temporary medical leave . . . in cases involving inability to work
because of a serious health condition” was introduced in the 100th Congress. Parental and
Medical Leave Act, S. 2488, 100th Cong. (1988). This is the same Congress to pass the
Handicapped Programs Technical Amendments Act of 1988, H.R. 5334, 100th Cong. (1988),
section 206(a) of which amended section 501 of the Rehab Act when President Reagan signed
it into law, Pub. L. No. 100-630, 102 Stat. 3289. See also Rehabilitation Act Amendments of
1992, H.R. 5482, 102d Cong.; Handicapped Programs Technical Amendments Act of 1988,
H.R. 5334, 100th Cong.
128. Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 121 (1994).
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VEVRAA was born out of veterans from a different era
returning from war. During the height of the Vietnam War and the
height of the 1972 Presidential election, Congress passed and
President Nixon signed the precursor to VEVRAA—the Vietnam
Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1972 (not VEVRAA,
which was enacted in 1974)—requiring that all contracts with
federal agencies contain provisions requiring contractors to “give
special emphasis to the employment of qualified disabled veterans
and veterans of the Vietnam era.”129 Two years later, in December
1974 during the waning months of the Vietnam War, Congress
passed and newly inaugurated President Ford signed VEVRAA
into law.130 VEVRAA has been amended several times since then,131
but legislative history on references to accommodations throughout
those amendments is sparse. Undoubtedly, this is because, inter
alia, the statutory text defining “qualified” as “having the ability to
perform the essential functions of the position with or without
reasonable accommodation for an individual with a disability” did
not become part of VEVRAA until the Jobs for Veterans Act of
2002,132 not to mention VEVRAA’s significant overlap with the
ADA and the Rehab Act. Witnesses at congressional hearings on
VEVRAA occasionally cited some examples of accommodations for
veterans with a disability that they believed were required by
VEVRAA without listing leave as an example,133 and other

129. Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-540,
Title V, § 503(a), 86 Stat. 1097 (1972).
130. Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-508,
Title IV, § 402, 88 Stat. 1593.
131. Honoring America’s Veterans and Caring for Camp Lejeune Families Act of 2012,
Pub. L. No. 112-154, Title VII, § 708, 126 Stat. 1207; Jobs for Veterans Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-288, § 2(b)(1), (2)(A)–(C), 116 Stat. 2034, 2035; Veterans Benefits and Health Care
Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-419, Title III, § 322(a), (b), 114 Stat. 1855; Veterans
Employment Opportunities Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-339, §§ 7(a), 8, 112 Stat. 3188, 3189;
Veterans’ Benefits Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-446, Title VII, § 702(a), 108 Stat.
4674; Department of Veterans Affairs Codification Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-83, §§ 4(b)(8),
5(a), (c)(1), 105 Stat. 405, 406; Veterans’ Compensation, Education, and Employment
Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-306, Title III, § 310(a), 96 Stat. 1442; Veterans’
Rehabilitation and Education Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-466, Title V, § 509, Title
VIII, § 801(j), 94 Stat. 2206, 2217; Veterans’ Administration Programs Extension Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-520, § 6(a), 92 Stat. 1821; Veterans’ Education and Employment Assistance Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-502, Title VI, §§ 605, 607(2), 90 Stat. 2405.
132. Jobs for Veterans Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-288, § 2(b)(1), 116 Stat. 2034.
133. See, e.g., Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Education, Training and Employment of
the Comm. on Veterans’ Affair, 97th Cong. 83–84 (handbook of the U.S. Postal Service listing
examples of ostensibly required employee accommodations).
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witnesses mentioned veterans getting fired for taking leave for
doctor’s appointments134 or argued for increased training
concerning providing accommodations to veterans with a
disability.135 Yet, throughout the entire legislative history of
VEVRAA and its amendments, no legislator mentions VEVRAA
requiring leave as an accommodation. Furthermore, as was the case
with the Rehab Act, the same Congresses that passed substantive
amendments to VEVRAA considered, but failed to pass, at least one
bill that would have required employee leave.136 Similarly,
unrelated sections of VEVRAA itself provide leave rights to
veterans called to military training and service.137 Legislative
silence on leave as an accommodation throughout VEVRAA’s
history provides no guidance on the issue, whereas congressional
inaction regarding employee leave during sessions in which
Congress considered VEVRAA and its substantive amendments
arguably supports the conclusion that VEVRAA does not require
leave as an accommodation at all.
Finally, we turn to Title I of the ADA. The bill that would
ultimately become the ADA was first drafted by the National
Council on Disability, an independent federal agency whose
members were appointed by President Reagan, and first introduced
in Congress in April 1988 by Sen. Lowell Weicker and Rep. Tony
Coelho.138 Debate over the ADA lasted for years, spanning two

134. Health Concerns of Persian Gulf Veterans: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Veterans’
Affairs, 103d Cong. 111 (1994) (statement of Penny Larrisey, Organizer, Operation Desert
Shield/Storm).
135. See, e.g., Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Education, Training and Employment of the
Comm. on Veterans’ Affair, 97th Cong. 118 (statement of Ronald W. Drach, National
Employment Director, Disabled American Veterans) (“We believe that much needs to be
done in the area of affirmative action for [qualified disabled veterans, amongst others,] and
suggest that OPM consider the establishment of training programs for Personnel Directors
and other staff involved in the personnel process to train them in the area of affirmative
action[, including] reasonable accommodations to physical handicaps.”).
136. A bill that, inter alia, would have excluded short-term illnesses and other
conditions from coverage under the FMLA was introduced in the 107th Congress. Family
and Medical Leave Clarification Act, H.R. 2366, 107th Cong. (2001). This is the same Congress
to pass the Jobs for Veterans Act, H.R. 4015, 107th Cong. (2001), section 2 of which
amended VEVRAA when President George W. Bush signed it into law, Pub. L. No. 107-288,
116 Stat. 2033.
137. Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–508,
Title IV, § 404, 88 Stat. 1578 (1974).
138. ARLENE MAYERSON, DISABILITY RTS. EDUC. & DEF. FUND, THE HISTORY OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (1992), https://dredf.org/about-us/publications/thehistory-of-the-ada/.
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sessions of Congress, myriad hearings, and consideration by an
unprecedented four House committees and one Senate committee,
until it was finally passed by the 101st Congress—first by the Senate
on September 9, 1989; then by the House on May 22, 1990 in a
different form; and by both chambers in July 1990 via a Conference
Report—and signed by President George H.W. Bush on July 26,
1990.139 The final vote on the Conference Report was 377-28 in the
House and 91-6 in the Senate.140
Throughout the ADA’s long legislative history, leave is
mentioned several times, most often in the context of leave needed
for employees to treat HIV.141 However, the first instance of leave
appearing in the legislative history does not occur until May 1990,
two years after the bill was first introduced and several months
after the Senate had first approved it. On May 15, 1990, after the
Senate had voted on the initial bill but before the House did, the
twenty-two majority members of the House Committee on
Education and Labor142 delivered a report to the House
summarizing their view that “[r]easonable accommodation may
also include providing additional unpaid leave days, if such
provision does not result in an undue hardship for the
employer.”143 Of those twenty-two members, only nineteen
ultimately voted for the bill during the roll call vote on July 12, 1990;
two did not vote, and one could not vote.144 Two days later, in
139. Id.; Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, S. 933, 101st Cong. (enacted).
140. 136 CONG. REC. 17, 296–97 (1990) [hereinafter ADA Final House Vote]; id. 17,375–
76 (1990) [hereinafter ADA Final Senate Vote].
141. For a recounting of the savvy politicking undertaken to include HIV and AIDS as
disabilities within the ADA’s scope, see Lennard J. Davis’s tour de force book on the legislative
history of the ADA, Enabling Acts: The Hidden Story of How the Americans With Disabilities Act
Gave the Largest US Minority Its Rights (2015), especially Chapters 6 and 13.
142. CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 101ST CONGRESS, OFFICIAL LIST OF
STANDING COMMITTEES & SUBCOMMITTEES FOR THE 101ST CONGRESS 14 (Sept. 5, 1990).
[hereinafter 101st House Committee List]. Rep. Patsy Mink did not become a member of the
committee until September 1990, which was several months after the committee’s May 1990
report was delivered to the House. CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 101ST
CONGRESS, OFFICIAL ANNOTATED MEMBERSHIP ROSTER BY STATE WITH VACANCY AND SPECIAL
ELECTION INFORMATION FOR THE 101ST CONGRESS 495 (Jan. 3, 1989).
143. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 345.
144. All voting majority members of the committee voted for the bill except Reps. Ford
and Martinez, who were not present to vote. ADA Final House Vote, supra note 140. Resident
Commissioner Fuster could not vote on the final disposition of legislation on the floor, so he
did not vote on the bill. See R. ERIC PETERSEN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31856, RESIDENT
COMMISSIONER FROM PUERTO RICO (2009), http://congressionalresearch.com/RL31856/
document.php.
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debate on the House floor on May 17, 1990, before the House would
vote on the bill five days thereafter, Rep. Theodore S. Weiss (who
would also ultimately vote for the bill) opined that the ADA would
“ensure that persons with HIV have the right to flexible hours and
time off that are crucial to help accommodate the disease.”145
After the House passed a bill on May 22, 1990, differing from
the one that the Senate had passed the prior fall, twenty-one House
managers submitted a Conference Report to the House on July 12,
1990, within which they advised that
if an individual has an infectious disease that can be eliminated
by taking medication for a specified period of time, the employer
must offer the employee the reasonable accommodation of
allowing the individual time off to take such medication. Of
course, this accommodation would be subject to the same “undue
hardship” limitation which applies to all accommodations under
this title.146

Ultimately, twenty of those twenty-one managers would vote
for the bill, with one abstaining.147 Of the twenty, only three were
also majority members of the House Committee on Education and
Labor, and all of them voted for the bill.148 Several representatives
spoke on the floor of the House on behalf of the Conference Report
on the day that it was submitted: Reps. Major R. Owens and Henry
Waxman professed that “the bill will be particularly important
in ensuring that people with HIV disease have the right to
flexible work schedules and to time off to accommodate their
treatment needs or their various disease-related conditions,” Rep.
Don. Edwards cited “allowing the employee time off to recover
from [a contagious] disease” as an example of a “reasonable
accommodation,” and Rep. Howard Berman restated the
Conference Report’s text concerning time off.149
145. 136 CONG. REC. 10,872 (1990); see also ADA Final House Vote, supra note 140
(showing Rep. Weiss’s vote).
146. H.R. REP. NO. 101-596, at 67–68; 136 CONG. REC. 17,268 (1990).
147. ADA Final House Vote, supra note 140. Rep. Martinez did not vote. Id.
148. Id.; 101st House Committee List, supra note 142.
149. 136 CONG. REC. 17,289 (1990) (statement of Rep. Owens); id. at 17,290 (multiple
statements of Rep. Edwards); id. at 17,293 (statement of Rep. Waxman); id. at 17,294
(statement of Rep. Berman). Reps. Owens and Edwards already signaled their support for
leave as an accommodation by signing on to the Conference Report itself, but Reps. Waxman
and Berman, both of whom voted for the final bill, ADA Final House Vote, supra note 140,
add new names to the list of representatives supporting leave as an accommodation at least
some of the time.
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On the following day, the ten Senate managers submitted the
Conference Report to the Senate, after which one of the managers,
Sen. Ted Kennedy, cited “allowing [an] employee time off to
recover from [a] disease” as an example of a “reasonable
accommodation,” and went on to say that “the reasonable
accommodation provision of the bill will be particularly important
in ensuring that people with HIV disease have the right to flexible
work schedules and to time off to accommodate their treatment
needs or their various disease-related conditions.”150 All ten of
those managers voted for the final bill.151
In sum, the ADA’s legislative history demonstrates that at least
39 House members of the 377 who voted for the ADA,152 as well as
at least 10 Senate members of the 91 who voted for the ADA,
supported leave as an accommodation at least some of the time.
Such sentiment comports with the ADA’s text and tracks the
regulations later promulgated by the EEOC stating that leave can
be an accommodation at least some of the time without clarifying
when. Moreover, although this legislative history fails to evidence
a majority of support for leave as an accommodation in either
chamber, it is telling that the statements in support of leave were
made on the floor of both chambers, in a key committee report, and
in both Conference Reports, all of which were publicly available
to the House and Senate members before their final votes.
Significantly, not a single legislator opined that leave can never be
an accommodation. Looking at this legislative history of the ADA
suggests, but certainly does not make clear, that leave can be an
accommodation at least some of the time.
However, it is worth looking outside the context of the ADA for
contradictory evidence, as there was far more debate over
employee leave throughout the halls of the 101st Congress beyond
the confines of the ADA—that is, debate about the recently
proposed FMLA.153 That session, both houses of Congress passed
the FMLA, which would have required employee leave in certain

150. 136 CONG. REC. 17,377 (1990).
151. H.R. REP. NO. 101-596, at 71–72 (listing the ten Senate managers); ADA Senate
House Vote, supra note 140 (showing their votes).
152. The sum of the nineteen members of the House Committee on Education and
Labor; the seventeen discrete House managers of the Conference Report; and Reps. Weiss,
Waxman, and Burman is thirty-nine.
153. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 102-135, pt. 1 (1991).
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situations, but it was vetoed by President George H.W. Bush.154
Amid intense debate over employee leave during the very same
congressional session in which the ADA passed, one could argue
that, had Congress meant the ADA to require leave as
accommodation, it probably would have said so explicitly. But it
did not. In fact, in an extension of remarks not read on the floor,
Rep. Larry Craig cited the ADA’s obligations on employers as
wholly distinct from the “medical leave” obligations that the FMLA
would have imposed on employers had it passed that session,155
potentially implying an understanding within Congress at the
time that the ADA did not impose leave obligations on employers
at all. Yet, if we must synthesize legislative history, neither the
lack of more robust debate over leave during passage of the
ADA nor Rep. Craig’s implication that it may not require “medical
leave” are as persuasive as the multiple statements of support for
leave as an accommodation from dozens of members of both
houses of Congress.
Finally, the section of the ADA defining “qualified individual”
as one who “can perform” the job (and, indeed, all of Title I of the
ADA) has been amended twice, first by the Civil Rights Act of
1991156 and second by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.157
However, nowhere in the voluminous legislative history of either
of these acts are leaves as an accommodation explicitly mentioned
by any members of Congress. At best, at a hearing on the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008 before the House Judiciary Committee on
September 13, 2006, an interested organization, the Consortium for
Citizens with Disabilities (CCD), told the committee about two
instances of disability leave accommodations that were denied by
courts, the first when the employee had mitigated her disability and
the second because the disability allegedly did not substantially
limit major life activities.158 Both of these complaints went to the
heart of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008—expanding the scope
of “disability” under the ADA.159 Presumably, if the committee
members or the CCD were concerned that leave should not have
154. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1990, H.R. 770, 101st Cong.
155. 136 CONG. REC. E1774-02, E1774 (1990).
156. Civil Right Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1077.
157. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 5(c)(1), 122 Stat. 3553, 3557.
158. Americans with Disabilities Act: Sixteen Years Later: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
the Const. of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 109th Cong. 915–16, 917–18 (2006).
159. See ADA Amendments Act § 2.
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been an accommodation in those circumstances, someone would
have said so, suggesting a widespread agreement that leave can be
an accommodation at least some of the time. Yet, drawing
conclusions from such silence is tenuous and unnecessary.
In sum, the review of legislative history provides limited, but
reasonable, support for the text-and-regulation-based conclusion
vis-à-vis Title I of the ADA that leave probably can be an
accommodation at least some of the time, although the legislative
history fails to provide the sort of nuanced support necessary to
clarify which sorts of leave are permissible. Finally, the silence of
legislative history concerning leave as an accommodation under
the Rehab Act and VEVRAA is unhelpful, leaving us only with
alternative sources like statutory text and agency guidance.
C. Extrinsic Interpretations
Having exhausted a capacious, albeit hermetic, analysis of
the laws regulating leave as an accommodation in sections I.A–B,
this section considers guidance from courts and scholars. Herein,
I review interpretations of disability leave as an accommodation
generally, as well as accommodating disability leave when the
employee cannot work, disability leave that thwarts the
predictability of business operations for employers, and long-term
disability leave.
Although the Supreme Court has never considered leave as an
accommodation under any of the federal disability accommodation
laws, all but one circuit court with relevant jurisdiction has held
that leave may be an accommodation at least some of the time.160
160. Delaval v. PTech Drilling Tubulars, LLC, 824 F.3d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Time
off . . . can be a reasonable accommodation . . . .”); Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337,
345 n.7 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[A] leave request will not be unreasonable on its face so long as
it [meets several requirements] . . . .”); Santandreu v. Miami Dade Cnty., 513 F. App’x 902,
905 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[A] leave of absence may be a reasonable accommodation . . . .”);
Brannon v. Luco Mop Co., 521 F.3d 843, 849 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[A]llowing a medical leave of
absence might, in some circumstances, be a reasonable accommodation . . . .”); Taylor v. Rice,
451 F.3d 898, 910 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“An employee’s proposed accommodation seeking to use
leave time to receive necessary medical care will be reasonable in many circumstances.”);
Fogleman v. Greater Hazleton Health All., 122 F. App’x 581, 585 (3d Cir. 2004) (“In some
instances, it may be possible for a requested leave of absence to constitute a reasonable
accommodation.”); Humphrey v. Mem’l Hosps. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“A leave of absence for medical treatment may be a reasonable accommodation under the
ADA.”); García-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 650 (1st Cir. 2000)
(“[R]etaining the ailing employee’s slot while granting unsalaried leave may be a reasonable
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To date, only the Second Circuit is silent on leave as an
accommodation,161 although nearly all of the district courts within
that circuit concur with the majority of circuits.162 Indeed, other
than the U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont, which has
yet to consider the issue, the country is on the same page in
concluding that leave may be an accommodation at least some of
the time. Courts have analyzed section 501 of the Rehab Act in a
materially identical manner, although fewer courts have done so.163
Finally, neither courts nor administrative law judges have
considered section 503 of the Rehab Act or VEVRAA in the context
of leave as an accommodation, most likely because there is no

accommodation required by the ADA.”); Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer’s Rsch. Ctr., 155 F.3d
775, 783 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[A] medical leave of absence can constitute a reasonable
accommodation under appropriate circumstances.”); Haschmann v. Time Warner Ent. Co.,
151 F.3d 591, 601 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]here was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable
juror could conclude that the second medical leave, as requested, would have been a
reasonable accommodation.”); Hudson v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 87 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th
Cir. 1996) (“[A] reasonable allowance of time for medical care and treatment may, in
appropriate circumstances, constitute a reasonable accommodation.”).
161. Wenc v. New London Bd. of Educ., 702 F. App’x 27, 30 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[W]e have
not squarely addressed in a published opinion when a medical leave may constitute a
‘reasonable accommodation’ under the ADA . . . .”).
162. Forgione v. City of New York, No. 11-CV-5248, 2012 WL 4049832, at *9 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 13, 2012) (“[A] request for leave may constitute a reasonable accommodation in certain
circumstances . . . .”); Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., No. 103-CV-266 (GLS/RFT), 2009 WL
819380, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2009) (stating that a request for leave “may constitute a
reasonable accommodation”), aff’d on other grounds, 353 F. App’x 558 (2d Cir. 2009); Cousins
v. Howell Corp., 113 F. Supp. 2d 262, 271 (D. Conn. 2000); Karn v. Williams Advanced
Materials, No. 02-CV-0852E(F), 2005 WL 1397014, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. June 13, 2005) (holding
that “a short leave of absence” may be a reasonable accommodation); Powers v. Polygram
Holding, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d 195, 201–02 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“[T]he ADA contemplates leaves
of absence as a possible reasonable accommodation under the ADA.”).
163. Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding the agency “reasonably
accommodated” an employee’s disability under the Rehab Act by allowing leave);
Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 1989) (explaining that federal agencies must,
before firing an employee with a disability, “afford him [or her] an opportunity to participate
in an inpatient program, using accrued or unpaid leave, unless the agency can establish that
it would suffer an undue hardship from the employee’s absence”); Nandori v. City of
Bridgeport, No. 3:12CV673 JBA, 2014 WL 186430, at *5 (D. Conn. Jan. 16, 2014) (“‘[M]edical
leave may be a reasonable accommodation under the [Rehabilitation Act].’”); Johnson v.
Sullivan, 824 F. Supp. 1146, 1156 (D. Md. 1991) (stating that “leave to attend to medical
problems” is an accommodation under the Rehab Act), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.
Johnson v. Shalala, 991 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1993); Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126, 137
(D.D.C. 1984) (“[T]he reasonable accommodation duty [imposed by the Rehab Act] requires
the agency to evaluate whether . . . leave . . . would have imposed an undue hardship on the
agency.”), aff’d sub nom. Whitlock v. Brock, 790 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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private right of action under either statute164 and because they
largely overlap with other statutes like the ADA.
A handful of decisions interpreting the Rehab Act as requiring
leaves as accommodations in some situations predate the
enactment of the ADA,165 potentially suggesting that these earlier
decisions were ratified and incorporated by the legislators behind
the ADA. If true, then perhaps the ADA definitively requires leave
as an accommodation at least some of the time. After all, Title I of
the ADA directs agencies with enforcement authority over the
statutes to “prevent[] [the] imposition of inconsistent or conflicting
standards for the same requirements under [Title I of the ADA]
and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,”166 suggesting that the ADA
intended to substantively copy-and-paste the extant law of the
Rehab Act into a large swath of the private sector. Yet, if we are to
rely on legislative intent to shape the meaning of the ADA, it speaks
great volumes that Congress failed to cite either of these earlier
Rehab Act cases in debate over the ADA, and the cases never
received significant press. Thus, there is no evidence that Congress
considered these cases, let alone ratified or incorporated them,
when passing the ADA.
Proceeding to the heart of the matter, we next turn to how
courts assess the central thesis of this Article. Foremost, courts are
split on whether the law requires accommodating employees with
reasonable leave that imposes no undue hardship when they
cannot work presently. Courts run the gamut from rightly
excluding such employees as unqualified for the right reason,
righty excluding such employees as unqualified for the wrong
reason, and mistakenly including such employees as qualified.
Starting with an example of a court to reach the correct holding for
the correct reason, in an Eighth Circuit opinion written by Judge C.
Arlen Beam, the court cites the ADA’s definition of “qualified
individual” before holding that “it is axiomatic that in order for [an
employee with a disability] to show that she could perform the
essential functions of her job, she must show that she is at least able
to show up for work.”167 Applying that apt construction of the ADA
164. Riley v. Outlook Neb., Inc., No. 8:12CV168, 2013 WL 12123508, at *2 (D. Neb. Feb.
4, 2013) (collecting cases); Douris v. Bucks Cnty. Off. of Dist. Att’y, No. CIV.A.04-CV-232,
2005 WL 226151, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2005) (collecting cases).
165. See, e.g., Rodgers, 869 F.2d at 259; Whitlock, 598 F. Supp. at 137.
166. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b).
167. Browning v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 178 F.3d 1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 1999).
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to the facts at bar, Judge Beam noted that the plaintiff, a claims
representative who was recovering from surgery and dealing with
the emotional struggle of having to do so, was “unable to report to
work” due to her physical and, at times, mental incapacity,
rendering her unqualified for an accommodation.168 Judge Beam’s
opinion is emblematic of an ideal analysis.
In a similar vein, in a Fifth Circuit opinion penned by Judge
Edith H. Jones, the court cited the same statutory provision before
holding that “[b]ecause [a mechanic recuperating from ankle
surgery] could not attend work, he is not a ‘qualified individual
with a disability’ under the ADA.”169 Had that concluded the
matter, Judge Jones’s opinion would have been as ideal as that of
Judge Beam’s. Yet, the opinion went on to (1) argue that attendance
is an essential function of the job (which, as I explained, supra, is an
unnecessary thicket to navigate), and (2) cite with approval a
Fourth Circuit case concluding that an employee “who does not
come to work cannot perform any of his job functions, essential or
otherwise.”170 Not true. Employees B and D did not come to work,
but they could have performed the functions of the job if they had
wanted to, meaning they were qualified.
In an unrelated Fourth Circuit opinion, Judge J. Harvie
Wilkinson III remarked of Title I of the ADA and its regulations:
Significantly, these provisions contain no reference to an
individual’s future ability to perform the essential functions of
his position. To the contrary, they are formulated entirely in
the present tense, framing the precise issue as whether an
individual “can” (not “will be able to”) perform the job with
reasonable accommodation.171

True enough. However, in that case, the panel denied the
requested accommodation (i.e., indefinite leave) only on
unreasonableness grounds without commenting on whether it was
also indefensible because the employee was unable to do his job
and, thus, unqualified.172 In a recent Sixth Circuit decision by Judge
Ronald Lee Gilman, the panel likewise sidestepped the issue of
whether and when disability leave as an accommodation renders
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 1047–49 (emphasis added).
Rogers v. Int’l Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 757, 759 (5th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 759 (quoting Tyndall v. Nat’l Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994)).
Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1995).
Id.
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employees unqualified, instead resting its holding entirely on
indefinite leave being unreasonable.173
As a brief tangent, while the DOL’s regulations implementing
the FMLA explicitly list “intermittent leave” as permissible,174
neither the federal disability accommodation statutes nor the
regulations that implement them provide any clarity on
intermittent leave. As such, courts have split over the
reasonableness of disability leaves that fail to provide employers
sufficient certainty vis-à-vis when their employees can work (e.g.,
leaves that may be called intermittent, indefinite, irregular,
reoccurring, sporadic, erratic, frequent, and/or unpredictable).175
As an example, the Tenth Circuit has concluded that “the ADA
does not require an employer to grant an employee indefinite leave
as an accommodation” because indefinite leave is unreasonable.176
On the other hand, representing the minority view, the First Circuit
has concluded that indefinite leave can be reasonable in certain
situations, so employers can deny such accommodations only if
they impose an undue hardship on this particular set of facts.177
Respectfully, these analyses jump the gun. Instead of first
considering whether the employees requesting indefinite leave are
qualified under the relevant statutory texts, these courts focus on
the reasonableness and/or the undue hardship of such leave, both
of which may be mooted by the unqualified inquiry.
Where some, like Judge Beam, rightly analyze whether
employees requesting disability leave are qualified, other judges
have muddied the waters with analyses that reach the right result
for the wrong reason. For instance, Judge Frank Easterbrook,
writing for a panel of the Seventh Circuit in considering leave as an
accommodation for a night-shift engineer with depression that
caused hallucinations, panic attacks, and suicidal ideation, held:

173. Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC, 847 F.3d 384, 394–95 (6th Cir. 2017).
174. 29 C.F.R. § 825.202(a) (2021).
175. EEOC Performance and Conduct Standards, supra note 24, at n.76 (collecting
agency interpretations and cases discussing whether indefinite leave requests are
unreasonable and/or undue hardships).
176. Hudson v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 87 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Myers,
50 F.3d at 283); see also Stacy A. Hickox & Joseph M. Guzman, Leave as an Accommodation:
When Is Enough, Enough?, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 437, 457–63 (2014).
177. García-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 648–50 (1st Cir. 2000); see
also Romanello v. Intesa Sanpaolo, S.p.A., 22 N.Y.3d 881, 885 (2013) (reaching a similar
conclusion under New York City’s municipal analog to the ADA).
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The sort of accommodation contemplated by the [ADA] is one
that will allow the person to “perform the essential functions of
the employment position”. Not working is not a means to perform
the job’s essential functions. An inability to do the job’s essential
tasks means that one is not “qualified”; it does not mean that the
employer must excuse the inability.178

Here, Judge Easterbrook distorts the text of the ADA. He claims
that the ADA permits only those accommodations that allow
an employee to perform the job presently. In reality, the ADA
permits accommodations only when an employee can do their job.
The subtle distinction between these propositions is best
elucidated, unsurprisingly, by a leave of absence. When one takes
leave voluntarily, one can perform the job presently even if the
employee is not doing so. “Can perform” and “will perform” mean
different things.
Judge Easterbrook goes on to write that an “[i]nability to work
for a multi-month period removes a person from the class protected
by the ADA” because such person is not a “qualified individual.”179
While it appears that the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion reached the
correct result in that the employee here suffered from
incapacitating depression and, hence, likely could not do the job at
the start of his leave, the panel’s reasoning regrettably relies not on
the employee being unqualified when his leave would have started,
but instead on the length of that leave rendering him unqualified.
The Seventh Circuit has repeated this faulty construction of the
ADA in a few additional cases, most recently in one opinion,
Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., which not only garnered
significant press but was also considered on petition for certiorari
by the Supreme Court; that petition was denied.180 In that case,
178. Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2003).
179. Id.
180. Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., 872 F.3d 476, 479 (7th Cir. 2017) (reasoning
that an employee whose disability necessitates a “long-term medical leave cannot work and
thus is not a ‘qualified individual’ under the ADA”), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1441 (2018);
see also Basden v. Pro. Transp., Inc., 714 F.3d 1034, 1037 (7th Cir. 2013) (“A plaintiff
whose disability prevents her from coming to work regularly cannot perform the essential
functions of her job, and thus cannot be a qualified individual for ADA purposes.”). For
sample press on Severson, see Case Comment, Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc.:
Seventh Circuit Rules That a Multimonth Leave of Absence Cannot Be a Reasonable Accommodation,
131 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2018); Tracie DeFreitas, Long-Term Leave and the ADA After
Severson, JOB ACCOMMODATION NETWORK, https://askjan.org/articles/Long-TermLeave-and-the-ADA-after-Severson.cfm (last visited Mar. 11, 2021); David J. Rowland &
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which was also written by Judge Easterbrook, the court declared
the ADA to be “an antidiscrimination statute, not a medical-leave
entitlement.”181 Respectfully, this rather provocative language
lacks any mooring in the text of the ADA or its legislative history,
as I demonstrated in sections I.A–B, supra. Nothing about the
statutory text or legislative history of the ADA says “leaves not
required” in the same way that the most famous antidiscrimination
statute in American history, Title VII, also carries with it a leave
entitlement, as construed by the Supreme Court.182
In a vein similar to that of Judge Easterbrook, then-Judge Neil
Gorsuch, writing for the Tenth Circuit, wrote that “reasonable
accommodations . . . are all about enabling employees to work, not
to not work” before holding that lengthy leaves as accommodations
(six months, in the case at bar) are both unreasonable and render
the employee unqualified.183 This opinion is of particular interest
given that its author now sits on the Supreme Court, thus giving us
a glimpse into how the Court might view disability leaves as
accommodations. Unfortunately, then-Judge Gorsuch makes one of
the same mistakes as Judge Easterbrook by hinging the ADA’s
“qualified individual” inquiry on the length of the leave and not on
whether the employee can work at the start of that leave.
Similarly, Judge George A. O’Toole, Jr., a district court judge
sitting by designation on a First Circuit panel, writing in a dissent
in another case, claimed that leave as an accommodation, ipso
facto, harbors an “oxymoronic anomaly”—viz., granting an
accommodation not to work to an employee who must be able to
work.184 “It cannot be overlooked,” Judge O’Toole argued, “that the
statute speaks in the present tense, indicative mood. A ‘qualified
individual with a disability’ entitled to the statute’s protection is a
person who ‘can perform the essential functions of the employment
position’ with reasonable accommodation. ‘Can perform,’ as in
‘now.’”185 Yet, Judge O’Toole confuses the analysis by stating that
Cheryl A. Luce, A Shocker from the Heartland: A Long Term Leave of Absence Is NOT a
Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA, EMP. L. LOOKOUT (Sept. 25, 2017),
https://www.laborandemploymentlawcounsel.com/2017/09/a-shocker-from-the-heartlanda-long-term-leave-of-absence-is-not-a-reasonable-accommodation-under-the-ada/.
181. Severson, 872 F.3d at 479.
182. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
183. Hwang v. Kan. State Univ., 753 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
184. García-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 651–52 (1st Cir. 2000)
(O’Toole, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 655 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)) (emphasis omitted).

1536

1537

Now and Again

employers must accommodate employees with disability leave
only if the length of that leave is “tolerably consistent with the
statutory words, ‘can perform,’” from which one can only imply
that brief leaves can be accommodations whereas longer leaves
cannot.186 Judge O’Toole also missteps by describing
accommodating disability leave as an “oxymoron” because he
clearly believes that the statute, if read literally in a manner that
he describes as “cramped and unrealistic,” entirely excludes
disability leaves as accommodations.187 Not so. Employees who
take voluntary disability leave are “qualified” for leave as an
accommodation because they can opt not to.
Finally, emblematic of a court reaching the wrong conclusion
by including employees as qualified when they are requesting
involuntary leaves is a Ninth Circuit opinion written by Judge
David R. Thompson. That case dealt with a sales associate who
physically could not work at the start of her leave or during its
pendency due to “a fainting disorder that caused episodes during
which she lost consciousness,” but the court deemed her not to be
an “unqualified individual” on that basis, reasoning that “her
inability to work during the leave period would not automatically
render her unqualified.”188 Although the panel is technically correct
that inability to work during a leave does not render one
unqualified, as was the case for employee B who became unable to
work during her leave, the sales associate here was also unable to
perform the essential functions of her job when leave began. That
is the end of the matter. On that basis alone, she should have been
deemed unqualified for leave as an accommodation, but the court
reasoned otherwise. In effect, the Ninth Circuit here was focused
only on the ability of the employee to work again, not the ability to
work now.
Likely in an attempt to circumvent the ADA’s purported
“oxymoronic anomaly,” courts have invented new standards that
are highly practical but divorced from the statutory text: an
employee requesting leave is “qualified” if the employee can
perform the essential functions of the job presently or will be able
to perform those functions “upon [the employee’s] return”189 or in
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1245, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999).
189. Humphrey v. Mem’l Hosps. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001); accord
Nunes, 164 F.3d at 1247.
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the “near”190 or “immediate”191 future. Had Congress meant to
include employees who cannot work now but will be able to do the
job at some point in the future—or, I should say, probably will, or
may, be able to do the job, since neither employers nor their
employees have crystal balls that predict whether the employee
will be able to work at some undefined future time—in the
definition of “qualified individual” in the disability
accommodation statutes, it would have done so. It did not. Title I
of the ADA, sections 501 and 503 of the Rehab Act, and VEVRAA
leave no room for any alternative interpretation; employees who
cannot work now are not qualified for leave or any other
accommodations under the text of those statutes.
Scholars and practitioners tend to conclude that leave can be an
accommodation at least some of the time without expounding upon
when, if ever, an employee’s inability to work would render that
employee unqualified,192 although some have called out, as Judge
O’Toole did, the supposed “counterintuitive” nature of providing
leave as an accommodation to a putatively unqualified
employee.193 Some scholars maintain that leave must be an
190. Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 151 (3d Cir. 2004), modified
on other grounds by Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 2009); Hudson v.
MCI Telecomms. Corp., 87 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 1996).
191. Wood v. Green, 323 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 2003); Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278,
283 (4th Cir. 1995).
192. See Lawrence P. Postol, ADA Open Issues: Transfers to Vacant Positions, Leaves of
Absence, Telecommuting, and Other Accommodation Issues, 8 ELON L. REV. 61, 75 (2016) (“[S]hort,
unpaid leaves of absence are a required reasonable accommodation under the ADA.”); Ann
C. Hodges, Working with Cancer: How the Law Can Help Survivors Maintain Employment,
90 WASH. L. REV. 1039, 1078–85 (2015); Nicole Buonocore Porter, The New ADA Backlash,
82 TENN. L. REV. 1, 73 (2014) (“Generally, leaves of absence are a reasonable form of
accommodation . . . .”); Megan G. Rosenberger, Absenteeism and the ADA: The Limits and the
Loopholes, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 957, 964 (2001) (“[I]ndividuals with chronic illnesses that
require sporadic or extended periods of time off may be covered by the ADA.”); Laura F.
Rothstein, The Employer’s Duty to Accommodate Performance and Conduct Deficiencies of
Individuals with Mental Impairments Under Disability Discrimination Laws, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV.
931, 960 (1997) (“[L]eave time for rehabilitation is an accommodation that should be
considered as a possible reasonable accommodation . . . .”); but see Passamano, supra note 77,
at 894 (“[L]eave is effectively not available as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA”
because “the employer is under no obligation to accommodate” an employee with leave
because “regular and predictable attendance is[,] as a matter of law[,] an essential function
of practically all employment.”).
193. See, e.g., EEOC Issues New Guidance on Leave and the ADA, PAYROLL MANAGER’S
LETTER, July 2016, at 6 (2016) (“To be protected by the ADA, an employee must show that he
or she is able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable
accommodation. And it would seem that an essential function of any job is the ability to show
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accommodation, at least in part, because they contend that a “literal
reading” of the ADA would be “unreasonably narrow and
impractical” as such a reading, ostensibly, would require an
accommodation to be “effective immediately in terms of enabling
an employee to perform the essential functions of the job.”194 With
respect, this analysis tracks Judge O’Toole’s misconstruction of the
statutory text and is mistaken for the reasons outlined above.
As a concluding note, the title of this Article is imbued with
irony. Idiomatically, “now and again” means “occasionally” or
“every once in a while,”195 whereas the literal meaning of “now and
again” is “presently and at some time in the future.” This
dichotomy bares a strikingly similarity to the attitude with which
most stakeholders view the statutory requirement that an employee
be able to perform the essential functions of the job to qualify for an
accommodation on one hand and my reconceived analytic on the
other. To put it another way, the conventional approach to
disability leave as an accommodation is to the idiomatic meaning
of “now and again” as this Article’s thesis is to its literal meaning.
While the conventional approach dictates disability leave as an
accommodation so long as, inter alia, the employee can work
occasionally, every once in a while, in the immediate or near future,
or some other likeminded, practical standard (i.e., the idiomatic
“now and again”), this Article argues that an employee qualifies for
disability leave as an accommodation only if, inter alia, the
employee can work, quite literally, now and again.
II. MAKING IT ALL WORK
Part II argues that federal disability accommodation law
excludes employees needing involuntary leaves as unqualified for
such accommodations. This Part assumes arguendo the correctness
of that thesis. If we assume the correctness of my argument, can we
implement it in such a way that practically makes sense within the
overall corpus of federal law? To that end, I first consider why
federal law always requires leave as an accommodation for
up for work. Nonetheless, while it may seem counterintuitive, the [EEOC] and many courts
take the position that time off from the job may be a required reasonable accommodation.”).
194. Stephen F. Befort, The Most Difficult ADA Reasonable Accommodation Issues:
Reassignment and Leave of Absence, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 439, 459 (2002) (citing García-Ayala
v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 655 (1st Cir. 2000) (O’Toole, J., dissenting)).
195. Every now and then, CHRISTINE AMMER, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF
IDIOMS: AMERICAN ENGLISH IDIOMATIC EXPRESSIONS & PHRASES (2d rev. ed. 2013).
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religious practices and beliefs, so long as leave is reasonable and
imposes no undue hardship, whereas I contend that federal law
only sometimes requires such disability leaves as an
accommodation (i.e., when the employee can work now). Second,
I consider provisions of the disability accommodation laws stating
that part-time and modified work schedules are permissible
accommodations, asking how those provisions can be read in
concert with the imperative that employees be able to work now to
qualify for leave as an accommodation. In both cases, the theme of
this Part is to discern whether we can harmonize federal law given
Part II’s reconceptualization of the preconditions for disability
leave as an accommodation. I argue that we can.
A. Leave for Religious Practices and Beliefs
This section considers the only other federal employee
accommodation statute (i.e., Title VII)196 to glean why it appears, at
least on the surface, dissimilar to Title I of the ADA vis-à-vis leave
entitlements. Inter alia, section 703 of Title VII bars covered entities
like employers with fifteen or more employees, employment
agencies, and labor organizations from discriminating against
employees based on “religion,”197 which “includes all aspects of
religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an
employer demonstrates that he [sic] is unable to reasonably
accommodate to an employee’s . . . religious observance or practice
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s
business.”198 Though the EEOC lacks congressional authority to
promulgate regulations implementing Title VII that carry the
force of law,199 it has issued interpretive guidance concerning

196. Federal law imposes no other affirmative accommodation obligations on
employers unless they discriminate on impermissible grounds in accommodating some
employees and not others. For example, there is no affirmative obligation to accommodate
employees’ pregnancies. Young v. UPS, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1344 (2015); Bradley A. Areheart,
Accommodating Pregnancy, 67 ALA. L. REV. 1125, 1133–39 (2016). This Article does not consider
antidiscrimination law.
197. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
198. Id. § 2000e(j).
199. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257–59 (1991), superseded by statute on
other grounds as stated in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 512 n.8 (2006); Gen. Elec. Co.
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976) (“Congress, in enacting Title VII, did not confer upon the
EEOC authority to promulgate rules or regulations pursuant to that Title.”), superseded by
statute on other grounds, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 995,
92 Stat. 2076 (1978).

1540

1541

Now and Again

religious accommodations that appears in the Code of Federal
Regulations.200 While these guidelines mention accommodations
because of “religious practices [that] conflict with [employees’]
work schedules,”201 leave is not explicitly mentioned as a
permissible accommodation under Title VII. Rather, the first
explicit mention of leave as an accommodation appears in the
EEOC’s subregulatory guidance.202 Relying on the text of Title VII
and not any iterations of the EEOC’s guidance, in Ansonia Board of
Education v. Philbrook, the Supreme Court held that reasonable
leaves are accommodations under Title VII so long as they impose
no undue hardship.203
Much like section 503 of the Rehab Act and VEVRAA, Executive
Order 11,246 requires federal contracts and subcontracts to contain
a provision wherein the private contracting entity agrees “not [to]
discriminate against any employee . . . because of . . . religion. . . .”204
The OFCCP, which is the sole agency to administer Executive
Order 11, 246,205 has promulgated regulations implementing that
order requiring employers to “accommodate to the religious
observances and practices of an employee . . . unless the employer
demonstrates that it is unable to reasonably accommodate to an
200. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2 (2021); see also EEOC v. Ithaca Indus., Inc., 829 F.2d 519, 522 (4th
Cir. 1987), rev’d on other grounds on reh’g en banc, 849 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1988); EEOC v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 623 F. Supp. 15, 17 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (“Unlike regulations issued
by federal agencies, EEOC interpretative guidelines do not have the force of law because
they are promulgated pursuant to statutory authority or according to the rulemaking process
dictated by the EEOC Administrative Procedure Act. Though they are often entitled to a
strong degree of deference, the interpretative guidelines are not dispositive of Title VII issues
and not binding upon courts, as are federal regulations.”) (citations omitted).
201. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(1).
202. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-NVTA-0000-20, WHAT YOU SHOULD
KNOW: WORKPLACE RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION (2014) (“Examples of common religious
accommodations include . . . an adherent to Native American spiritual beliefs needs unpaid
leave to attend a ritual ceremony . . . .”); Religious Discrimination, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/religion.cfm (last visited Mar. 15, 2021)
(“Unless it would be an undue hardship on the employer’s operation of its business, an
employer must reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs or practices. This
applies . . . to . . . leave for religious observances . . . .”).
203. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986) (“[The employer’s policy],
requiring [the plaintiff-employee] to take unpaid leave for holy day observance that
exceeded the amount allowed by the collective-bargaining agreement, would generally be a
reasonable one.”); id. at 74 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[U]npaid
leave will generally amount to a reasonable accommodation . . . .”) (emphasis omitted).
204. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 202(1), 3 C.F.R. § 339 (1964–1965), reprinted as amended in
42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
205. OFCCP, Jurisdiction Thresholds, supra note 39.
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employee’s . . . religious observance or practice without undue
hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”206 However,
no court or administrative law judge has considered Executive
Order 11,246 in the context of leave as an accommodation, most
likely because, inter alia, “virtually every federal court to consider
the issue has held that Executive Order 11[,]246 does not provide a
private right of action.”207 Regardless, there is no material
distinction between Executive Order 11,246 and Title VII vis-à-vis
leave as an accommodation, so any judge to consider the issue
would certainly hold as the Court did in Philbrook by finding that
leave is an accommodation for religious practices and beliefs when
reasonable and imposing no undue burden on the employer.
Note the difference between Title VII and Executive Order
11,246 on one hand and the federal disability accommodation
statutes on the other. Title VII and Executive Order 11,246 do not
limit accommodations to “qualified” employees in the way that
Title I of the ADA, sections 501 and 503 of the Rehab Act, and
VEVRAA do. Accordingly, there are no phrases like “can perform,”
“has the ability to perform,” or “having the ability to perform” that
exclude employees who cannot presently work from leave as an
accommodation. In that way, I contend that these laws are,
textually and theoretically, distinct. Yet, I simply cannot imagine or
locate a case of an involuntary religious leave that would concretize
that distinction in practice. By involuntary religious leave, I mean
leave to accommodate to an employee’s religious observance or
practice wherein the leave must be taken without any warning and,
at the start of which, the employee is physically, emotionally, or
mentally incapable of doing the job. The closest that I can come is
an employee who suddenly sees the light, like Saul knocked to the
ground en route to Damascus;208 needs immediate leave in
compliance with a religious tenet; and whose abrupt religious zeal
is so overpowering that, even if the employer demanded that the
employee work, the employee could not, as if inhibited by a
metaphysical wall, as if the prospect of blasphemy were so
overpowering that it rendered the employee, quite literally,
incapable of doing what they could otherwise do.
206. 41 C.F.R. § 60-50.3 (2021); see also U.S. OFF. OF FED. CONT. COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS,
supra note 40, at 114.
207. Riggs v. Boeing Co., No. 98-2091, 1999 WL 233285, at *1 (D. Kan. Mar. 4, 1999)
(collecting cases).
208. Acts 9:1–9 (New American Bible).
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Even if this far-out hypothetical were viable, can a religious
devotion render someone incapable of working in the same way
that some disabilities do? I doubt it. At most, employees may
become unable to work during leave for religious practices (e.g.,
employees whose religion requires them to consume alcohol),209
but Title VII would still afford leave as an accommodation to such
employees in the same way that I argue the ADA and similar laws
would afford leave as an accommodation to employee B. In both
cases, the employees can work at the start of their leave (i.e., when
they haven’t started drinking; when B hasn’t undergone anesthesia
for surgery yet), but they lose that ability during the leave. Hence,
I contend that Title VII and Executive Order 11,246 actually cohere
nicely with federal disability accommodation law, as I have
reconceived of it, as none of these laws require an employer to
accommodate an employee with involuntary leave when that
employee, at present, cannot perform the essential functions of the
job. The only difference is that laws like the ADA explicitly provide
as much (i.e., via the “qualified individual” provision) whereas the
nature of laws like Title VII inherently excludes involuntary leaves
like accommodations for religious beliefs and practices. That said,
even if I am wrong and there are cases of religious leave where the
employee unexpectedly and literally cannot work on account of a
religious belief or practice, but Title VII nonetheless requires that
the employer accommodate such a leave for lack of any “qualified
individual” provision, such divergence from federal disability
accommodation laws could be rationally justified on the basis of a
value judgment (i.e., federal law should offer more leeway to
employees’ religious beliefs and practices than it does to their
disabilities). In other words, federal law remains coherent.
B. Part-Time and Modified Work Schedules
Title I of the ADA explicitly states that accommodations “may
include . . . part-time or modified work schedules.”210 The EEOC
interprets section 501 of the Rehab Act as requiring the same kind
of accommodation,211 and the OFCCP’s regulations implementing
section 503 of the Rehab Act and VEVRAA likewise list “part-time
209. Yanki Tauber, The Purim Drunk, CHABAD.ORG, https://www.chabad.org/holidays/
purim/article_cdo/aid/2814/jewish/The-Purim-Drunk.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (emphasis added).
211. EEOC Accommodation Enforcement Guidance, supra note 24, at 2 n.1.
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or modified work schedules” as permissive accommodations.212
However, an employee may be unable to perform the essential
functions of the job when either of these accommodations begins,
seemingly contradicting the imperative that the employee be a
“qualified individual.” To the extent possible, provisions of statutes
should be interpreted “as a harmonious whole rather than at war
with one another.”213 Hence, we should find a way of reading these
provisions in harmony if we can.
For the sake of context, it is helpful to briefly define these
statutory terms of art as they are not defined by the statutes or any
of their regulations. “Part-time” means “[e]mployed . . . for part
of the time or for less than the customary time,”214 and “modified”
means “[l]imited, altered, [or] qualified.”215 Notice that “part-time”
work implies less work than the status quo (i.e., full-time), whereas
a “modified” work schedule could imply more or less work
than the status quo so long as the amount differs from that
status quo. Also note that all part-time work is necessarily modified
work whereas the reverse is not true. Moreover, I note that
these statutory provisions are materially similar to those requiring
leave in certain circumstances, meaning they imply only that parttime and modified schedules may be accommodations without
clarifying when.
That being said, to explore these provisions, consider another
set of five hypothetical employees: (1) Franco (F), who works as a
prison guard and suffers from a seizure disorder like Carlos, supra
section I.A.2, but his disorder causes so many seizures that he asks
to work a part-time or modified work schedule of 35 hours a week,
recognizing that approximately 5 hours each week, the timing of
which will be erratic, will be consumed by incapacitating seizures;
(2) Gina (G), who works as a car saleswoman who has muscular
dystrophy, requests a part-time work schedule of 10 hours per
week (worked all on one day or over multiple days; it does not

212. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-300.2(v)(2)(ii), 60-741.2(u)(2)(ii) (2021).
213. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018).
214. Part-time, 11 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 65; accord Part-time,
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 94.
215. Modified, 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 65; accord. Modify, WEBSTER’S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002). Synonyms for modify include change, alter,
adjust, adapt, amend, revise, refine, and tweak. Modify, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF SYNONYMS AND
ANTONYMS (3d ed. 2014).
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matter) instead of 40 hours per week;216 (3) Hiroshi (H), a computer
programmer with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD),
who requests a modified work schedule to begin in the next few
weeks that would let him start working 3 hours earlier than his
coworkers but still work his scheduled 8 hours per day;217 (4) Inez
(I) a computer programmer who works with Hiroshi, who suffers
from Parkinson’s Disease and requests a modified work schedule
to begin in the next few weeks so she starts work 3 hours later than
her coworkers but still work her scheduled 8 hours per day;218 and
(5) Julián (J), who works as a paralegal, has leukemia, and asks to
modify his work schedule so he can take a full day off for
chemotherapy treatment and work four ten-hour days instead of
five eight-hour days during one particular week.219
I classify these employees as follows. At the time his part-time
or modified work would begin, F is unable to perform the essential
functions of his job, just as C was unable to perform the essential
functions of his job when his seizures started. Therefore, for the
same reasons that C is unqualified, F is unqualified. In contrast, at
the time that G’s part-time and modified work schedule would
begin, she would be able to perform the essential functions of her
job some of the time, but she cannot perform the job full-time. Note
that I did not clarify whether G needs her accommodation to start
now or could permit it to begin at some time in the near future.
I declined to add this element because it does not matter; if working
10 hours per week as a car saleswoman is reasonable and such a
schedule imposes no undue hardship on this employer (e.g., the
employer could hire a new part-time salesperson to pick up the
slack), the point is that G can work those 10 hours right now,
whereas F cannot. Accordingly, the law requires that employers
accommodate G and not F, subject, as usual, to the reasonableness
and undue hardship inquiries.
Employees H, I, and J all need modified work schedules. So long
as it is reasonable for a computer programmer to work an earlier

216. These facts materially track some of the facts in Pals v. Schepel Buick & GMC Truck,
Inc., 220 F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 2000).
217. These facts materially track Example C in the Modified or Part-Time Schedule section
of the EEOC’s enforcement guidance. EEOC Accommodation Enforcement Guidance, supra
note 24, at 17–18 ¶ 22.
218. These facts materially track Example B in the same guidance. Id.
219. As explained infra, this example differs only in degree to employee D. See supra
note 60 and accompanying text.
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or later shift and this modified work schedule would impose no
undue hardship on this employer, then both H and I can perform
the essential functions of their jobs earlier or later than their
coworkers, and employers must accommodate them as such. Put
another way, when their accommodations would begin, they are
able to perform the essential functions of their jobs, so they are
qualified individuals under the law. Similarly, J’s proposed
modified work schedule looks materially similar to D’s proposed
leave to attend a doctor’s appointment. The only difference other
than degree (i.e., J needs a full day off; D needs only a few hours
off) is that J intends to make up lost time. Fine. As long as it is
reasonable for a paralegal to work ten-hour days four times per
week and that modified work schedule would impose no undue
hardship on this employer, J’s modified work schedule must
be accommodated.
In conclusion, statutory provisions sometimes requiring leave
as an accommodation are not materially distinct from statutory
provisions sometimes requiring part-time or modified work
schedules as an accommodation. In both cases, what matters, in
addition to the reasonableness and undue hardship inquiries, is
whether the employee can perform the essential functions of the job
at the time the part-time or modified work schedule begins. In my
conception, that coherent narrative persists throughout the federal
disability accommodation laws.
III. A CONCLUDING CALL TO ACTION
With the elevation of Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett
to the bench, the Supreme Court certainly has a textualist majority.220
220. See Evan Bernick, Judge Amy Coney Barrett on Statutory Interpretation: Textualism,
Precedent, Judicial Restraint, and the Future of Chevron, YALE J. REG. NOTICE & COMMENT BLOG
(July 3, 2018), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/judge-amy-coney-barrett-on-statutoryinterpretation-textualism-precedent-judicial-restraint-and-the-future-of-chevron-by-evanbernick/; Emily Bazelon & Eric Posner, Who Is Brett Kavanaugh?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/03/opinion/who-is-brett-kavanaugh.html; Jonathan
H. Adler, Justice Gorsuch’s First Opinions Reveal a Confident Textualist, WASH. POST (June 23,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/23/
justice-gorsuchs-first-opinions-reveal-a-confident-textualist/; Scott A. Moss, Judges’ Varied
Views on Textualism: The Roberts-Alito Schism and the Similar District Judge Divergence
That Undercuts the Widely Assumed Textualism-Ideology Correlation, 88 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1 (2017) (generally detailing the varying textualisms of Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Alito and Thomas); Anita Krishnakumar, Textualism and Statutory Precedents, 104 VA.
L. REV. 157, 161 (2018) (describing Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Thomas as
“self-avowed textualist[s]”).

1546

1547

Now and Again

And, while the lower federal courts are largely aligned on
concluding that employers must provide reasonable leaves as
accommodations under the federal disability accommodation
statutes so long as they impose no undue burden, such a conclusion
is not fait accompli at the High Court. Indeed, the conventional
analytic through which onlookers assess the federal disability
accommodation statutes stands poised for textualist attack given
my thesis. And it is right to attack atextual interpretations. But it is
also right to redirect our course toward a more just balance of
employee-employer rights before that can happen.
Congress and the President must take action to amend Title I
of the ADA to redefine a “qualified individual” as one who “can
or may be able to perform” the essential functions of the position,
thereby permitting leave as an accommodation for employees with
a disability even if those employees cannot, at present, do the job.
In so doing, the internal, cross-referential nature of the Rehab Act
will automatically kick in, giving employees who work for federal
contractors and subcontractors the right to take leave as an
accommodation under section 503 of the Rehab Act, too. As such,
employees would no longer be required to demonstrate a
present-tense ability to work, although the bounds of
reasonableness imposed by the statutes would still require the
reasonable possibility of their return to work eventually. Hence,
while I contend that the present state of the law requires an
employee’s ability to work “now and again,” the ideal future state
of the law would require an ability to work “not now, but again.”
By redefining Title I of the ADA in this quantitatively minor
but qualitatively major way, Congress can make a dramatic,
positive change for employees with a disability before it’s too
late, thus ensuring a just balance between the rights of workers and
their employers.
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